November 1967

NAMRATĀ

The Threshold of Departure

G. SRINIVASAN

The Subjectivity of the Self

BRIAN G. COOPER

Towards Christian-Hindu Dialogue

S. G. SATHAYE

Morals in the *Rigveda*

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THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XXXVIII - No. 11

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as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXXVIII NOVEMBER 1967 No. 11

The Threshold of Departure

Death is certain to all things which are born, and rebirth to all mortals; wherefore it doth not behove thee to grieve about the inevitable.

—*Bhagavad-Gita*, II. 27

The better is one thing, the dearer is another thing; these two bind a man in opposite ways. Of these two, it is well for him who takes the better; he fails of his object, who chooses the dearer. The better and the dearer approach a man; going round them, the sage discerns between them. The sage chooses the better rather than the dearer; the fool chooses the dearer, through lust of possession. ...

The great Beyond gleams not for the child, led away by the delusion of possessions. "This is the world, there is no other," he thinks, and so falls again and again under my [Death's] dominion.

—*Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II. 2, 6

Lo! you are now like a withered leaf. The messengers of Yama (Death) are fast approaching you. You stand on the threshold of departure. And you have made no provision for the journey.

Be wise. Make for yourself an island. Strive quickly. Purged of stains and sinless you will be ready for heaven, the world of the elect.

Your life has now drawn to a close. You are approaching the King of Death, Yama. There is no rest-house on the way. And you have made no provision for the journey.

Be wise. Make for yourself an island. Strive quickly. Purged of stains and sinless you will not return to birth and decay.

—*Dhammapada*, XVIII. 1-4

THE ABOVE VERSES from the *Dhammapada* are permeated with a sense of urgency. Lord Buddha calls to us to awake and to perceive the futility of efforts directed towards the attainment of immediate ends. Slaves to our lust and our pride, we are caught in the fever of self-gratification and have lost all sense of direction. Across the ages the Great Master cries out:

"Why this laughter, why this jubilation, when this world is burning, burning? Shrouded in darkness, why do you not seek for light?" (*Dhammapada*, XI. 1)

We are indeed blinded. Our sight is clouded by the dust of our illusions and we have made for ourselves a topsyturvy world wherein all is chaos and confusion and where man is divided from man and nation from nation. Shall we not pause ere it is too late? Shrouded in darkness shall we not seek for light?

One of the chief factors that has brought us to this impasse is our refusal to recall that life ends in death. The average man finds it unpleasant to think of death and consciously or unconsciously tries to forget that he too must die.

Yes, most men and women are disinclined to pause long enough to reflect upon death. Yet all know that death is certain. All know that death is the inevitable sequel to birth. Strange it is that we should try to forget what we know full well and that we should prefer to regulate our lives without taking into account that one day we all will necessarily have to face death, that already the messengers of Yama are fast approaching! Foolishly we cling to embodied life alone, to the life of the senses, as if it were the whole of human experience and could be prolonged indefinitely ...

By so doing we close our minds to higher influences from the inner planes of being and restricting our experience to the material world we not only become impoverished, but also deprive ourselves of the very means of evaluating human existence correctly. This in turn increases our fear of death and entrenches us in our refusal to think about it, or even to remember it at all. Fallacious reasons are advanced to justify our foolish attitude: after all we are alive now and must live in the present; it would be depressing to recall that we will die; it would lead to morbidity and even to neurosis, etc., etc. Not thus shall we conquer our fear of death. Fear is always the result of ignorance. We must seek to know and to understand and this we can only do by dwelling upon the universal fact of death.

Only the shock of bereavement compels the average person to ponder and to question. What is death? Why is there death? What purpose does it serve? What is its relationship to life? Frequently it is grief for the death of a loved one that marks the first awakening of the Soul's own memory. For the Soul *knows* and for it death holds no terror. The Soul has gone through many births and deaths, and accepts both as simply as we all accept waking and sleeping.

Meditation upon death is a beneficent practice which will unfold hid-

den potentialities to know and to understand. Such reflection has nothing morbid in it. It is not of a negative character; it is a positive and dynamic exercise that will restore to man a sense of proportion and a true sense of values. He will perceive that life includes both birth and death, and that to know the one we must know the other. The understanding of the meaning of death is indeed the key that will unveil the mystery of life. Hence, all the great Teachers have invited us to reflect upon death.

Śrī-Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* includes among the attributes of "true wisdom of a spiritual kind," "a meditation upon birth, death, decay, sickness, and error." And similarly Lord Buddha commends the practice of mindfulness regarding death. One of the Buddhist *bhāvanās* or forms of meditation is meditation upon death, *maraṇānussati bhāvanā,* and its practitioner is called upon to recall now and then that death must come: *maraṇaṁ bhavissati,* "death will take place."

Such meditation purifies the mind and raises the level of our consciousness. It gives us a better perspective and also prepares us to face death without fear, with calmness and fortitude. To quote from a Buddhist text:

> Now when a man is truly wise,
> His constant task will surely be,
> This recollection about death,
> Blessed with such mighty potency.
> (*Visuddhi Magga*)

And the reverse is equally true. Foolish is the man who ignores death and lives his life without taking it into account! To strive merely for wealth and fame, for worldly success and increase of riches, is a most short-sighted policy, to say the least; for no man can take away material possessions. These must all be left behind when Death claims his body. A wise man, therefore, will strive after perfection. The wealth he aspires to gather is not of a mortal nature, but of the Soul. Such wealth is permanent and is attained through living the disciplined life of a chaste mind.

One thus aware of death will not harbour thoughts of resentment. He will recognize the futility of quarrelling and, should a quarrel arise, he will wish to end it at once.

In daily life the thought of death will act as a deterrent and an energizer. The person will accept the flow of time and neither regret the past nor anticipate the future:

> Be free from the future; be free of the past; be free in the present; cross to the yonder shore. With a mind wholly free you will not fall into birth and death. (*Dhammapada,* XXIV. 15)

This freedom of the mind will make for adaptability to all the chang-

ing circumstances of life, including the passing into old age dreaded by so many. Old age can be happy and useful for those who have lived clean and unselfish lives. As Robert Browning has sung:

> Grow old along with me!
> The best is yet to be,
> The last of life, for which the first was made.

In old age we reap the harvest of the seeds planted in our youth. If these were sweet and wholesome so will the harvest be. And when this present life ends, then "the best is yet to be." The recognition of the Law of Karma, gained through our meditation upon birth and death, gives us the assurance:

> As a man throweth away old garments and putteth on new, even so the dweller in the body, having quitted its old mortal frames, entereth into others which are new. (*Bhagavad-Gita*, II. 22)

Indeed, the best is yet to be! And there is no cause for fear. Let us earnestly endeavour to make our life a fit preparation for death and for the lives to come; for "if thou cam'st prepared, then have no fear."

May we all deserve the blessing of freedom from fear!

NAMRATĀ

WE can never well be assured of Heaven, until we find it rising up within ourselves and glorifying our own souls. When true assurance comes, Heaven itself will appear upon the horizon of our souls, like a morning light chafing away all our dark and gloomy doubtings before it. We shall not need then to light up our candles to seek for it in corners; no, it will display its own lustre and brightness so before us, that we may see it in its own light, and ourselves the true possessors of it.

—JOHN SMITH

G. SRINIVASAN

The Subjectivity of the Self

[We are glad to publish this comparatively brief essay by our esteemed friend Dr. G. Srinivasan, Reader in Philosophy, Mysore University. He examines the different levels of the experience of subjectivity with characteristic and admirable lucidity.—ED.]

WHAT is most intimate to man is yet most mysterious to him. This is the paradox of the self. Man can never doubt the existence of his own "self" but when called upon to describe its structure he finds himself in a quandary. His confusion in this respect is mainly due to his habit of mind which exteriorizes the self and seeks to describe it as an objective concept. The objectivized self presents a logical riddle in which the unity of identity and difference remains logically unitelligible. By regarding what is unintelligible to our thought as an "'appearance"[1] the philosophical significance of the self comes to be overlooked. In truth, the unity of the self is "subjective" and experiential, not logical; the discrepancy which our logical thinking perceives within the self is its own creation and, once it is created, there is no way of resolving it. The objective approach to the self thus perceives a problem where none exists and seeks a solution where none is forthcoming.

A true understanding of the self should hence be founded upon human experience, which alone can provide the right context for a fair description of the self. The self as disclosing itself within human experience is not a logical concept but a concrete reality; its concreteness, moreover, is not that of an object or a thing but is that of a subject. The very existence of the self consists in its subjectivity or interiority and, deprived of it, the self loses its selfhood.[2] The subjectivity of the self is thus its unique characteristic, which distinguishes it from the rest of reality. It lies beyond all means of objective knowledge since its certainty is immediate and intuitive. The self in its subjectivity is best expressed by the first personal pronoun "I," which can be neither generalized nor objectivized.

The self experiences its subjectivity as its own and hence its knowledge of its own being is immediate and intuitive. Each self has this kind of access to its own being, but not to the being of any other self. It "meets" the other self in communication and recognizes it as a centre of experience and interiority like itself. In communication the other self becomes a "you" and this mutual recognition of subjectivity is the basis of intra-

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[1] This is the view held by F. H. Bradley in his *Appearance and Reality*.

[2] RAMANUJA: *Śrī Bhāṣya, trs.* GEORGE THIBAUT (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLIII, 1.4.3)

subjective communication. A self which is not a direct participant in communication but which is "spoken of" in it is a "he." "I," "you," and "he" respectively represent three different ways in which the subjectivity of the self comes to be acknowledged. In the "I" the self *is* its own subjectivity and hence its knowing coincides with its being. In the "you" the self *encounters* the subjectivity of the other self as other than its own, even though its knowledge in this respect is direct inasmuch as the other self is in communication with it. In the "he" the self either *presupposes* or *infers* the subjectivity of the other self, and its knowledge in this respect is indirect.

The subjectivity of the self implied by these personal pronouns presupposes personal distinctions and emerges out of them. Each self constitutes itself as subjectivity or "I," in the act of distinguishing itself from the rest of reality. This kind of subjectivity of the self can be said to be "exclusive" in character. But a more basic subjectivity of the self can be said to be "inclusive" in character. The "inclusive" subjectivity is characteristic of the self not in its diversity from the world but in its "unity" with it as consciousness-of-the-world. The self as consciousness-of-the-world is a unitary phenomenon into which the distinctions and divisions have not yet broken. The "inclusive" subjectivity of the self discloses the structural unity of the self with the object of its contact. But this kind of subjectivity is characteristic of the pre-reflective consciousness and not of reflective consciousness. For, when reflection sets in, it breaks the original unity of the self with the world and posits the self as against the not-self. This distinction of self and not-self, I and not-I, within and without, is, however, a distinction which occurs within the unitary structure of the "inclusive" subjectivity of the self as consciousness-of-the-world.

Of these two kinds of subjectivity, man is most familiar with his "exclusive" subjectivity, which, in other words, is his self-consciousness. But this self-consciousness is limiting, separative, and egoistic; it is pitched against a not-I, and has its being only as distinguished from the not-I. The "inclusive" subjectivity of the self, on the other hand, is what man usually "loses sight of" owing to the separative operation of his reflection. Reflection primarily divides or breaks the original unity of the self with the world and gives rise to the dichotomy of the self and not-self. The self in this dichotomized consciousness stands for the "I," and the not-self stands for everything other than the "I," comprising the other selves, external things, and one's own body. Reflection which is thus the source of all divisions or dichotomies is primary reflection.

But it is possible for man to regain the lost vision of his basic "inclusive" subjectivity founded upon his "unity" with the world by *another*

act of reflection which recuperates the "lost unity" of the self with the world. The act of reflection which thus restores the unity lost through primary reflection is secondary reflection.[3] Secondary reflection discloses the world not as something other than myself but as being constitutive of the subjective structural unity which I am. The several dichotomies disclosed in primary reflection come to be re-united here and seen as forming the single unbroken unity of the self. In secondary reflection, the body is no longer regarded as something which I *have* but as something which I *am* as an incarnate being; it comes to be regarded as part of my own being and not as something which is unlike me and opposed to me. The other selves are not looked upon as those from which I am distinguished but as those among whom I am one; I have my being constituted as being-in-communication with others and I am in this sense a being-with-others. Similarly, the things of the world are not looked upon as wholly unlike and opposed to my nature but as what I am actively concerned with; things are the "tools" which I use in realizing my ends, and as "tools" they enter into my life. I am, in other words, essentially a being concerned with things.

This distinction between primary and secondary reflection clearly shows how erroneous it would be to think that I am indubitably certain of my own existence in its "exclusive" subjectivity and that everything else is dubitable or at best only an inferred reality. This was the error implied in the Cartesian dictum *Cogito, ergo sum,* and it was the source of all "dualistic" problems which, because of their falsity at the source, could never be solved. The correct starting point of philosophical thinking should hence be the "inclusive" subjectivity of the self as disclosed in secondary reflection. The "inclusive" subjectivity of the self reveals the existence of other persons and things to be as certain as itself; its own existence is bound up with them and hence cannot be conceived otherwise.

There is, however, a third kind of subjectivity which is neither "exclusive" nor "inclusive" in the senses above described. It is a "transcendent" subjectivity in which the self bears no relation to the world. It lies "beyond" the reflective operations of the mind, and a self which attains to this state of consciousness abides in a state of pure being. This state of pure being is described as "liberation" or "freedom," since in it all the binding knots of the self with the world are broken. What is thus "beyond" reflection cannot be adequately described by words which reflection evolves for its own logical and practical purposes.

The transcendent subjectivity of the self is, however, described differently by the Hindu philosophical systems, depending upon the meta-

[3] GABRIEL MARCEL: *The Mystery of Being* (Chicago. 1951)

physical framework of each system. There are, broadly, two views on the nature of transcendent subjectivity. The first view describes the transcendent subjectivity as "objectless" subjectivity or as being its own object. This view is shared by the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the Advaita systems of philosophy. The second view of transcendent subjectivity regards it as capable of being in relation to an "object," this "object" being no other than *Brahman* or *Īśvara*. But this "object" is itself so "united" with the subject as to be its "inner ground," and hence there can be no "dualism" between them. This is the view of transcendent subjectivity maintained by the Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita systems of philosophy. But all these systems uniformly maintain that the transcendent subjectivity of the self is other than the principle of egoity (*ahaṁkāra*) which is the cause of "exclusive" subjectivity. In fact, Rāmānuja specially emphasizes the distinction between them so as to leave no room for confusion between them.[4] He regards the self as *ahaṁpadārtha* or the spiritual subject of experience, which is not a product of *avidyā* and hence whose reality is not confined to that of the body; it is distinct from *ahaṁkāra* or the principle of egoity which is born of *avidyā,* connected with the body, and the seat of pride.

The three kinds of subjectivity — the "exclusive," the "inclusive," and the "transcendent" — disclose the three poises of being of which the self is capable; the self is egoistic and practical in its "exclusive" subjectivity; it seeks to rise above the ego-centric limitations and becomes altruistic and philosophical in its "inclusive" subjectivity; it seeks to transcend this ethical level of being and becomes "spiritual" in its metaphysical or transcendent subjectivity.

G. SRINIVASAN

The world was more in me than I in it.
The King of Glory in my soul did sit.
And to Himself in me he always gave
All that he takes delight to see me have.
For so my spirit was an endless sphere,
Like God himself, and heaven and earth was there.

—THOMAS TRAHERNE

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[4] RAMANUJA: *Op. cit.*, I. 1.1; I. 1.4.

BRIAN G. COOPER

Towards Christian-Hindu Dialogue

[Readers will remember Mr. Brian G. Cooper, M.A., B.LITT., Lecturer in Liberal Studies, Lanchester College of Technology, Coventry, who has contributed often to our pages. This account of his interview with Canon Horace Dammers continues the line of ideation of his article "On East-West Understanding" in a specific aspect.—ED.]

MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING between the world's major religions ranks among mankind's most urgent needs. The world, like the individual of which it is the macrocosm, seeks wholeness through spiritual understanding. Yet mankind pursues this quest along divided paths; in different areas and civilizations of the globe, it approaches Truth from varying angles. All too easily, and too often in human history, this dividedness has expressed itself in mutual misunderstanding, ignorance, suspicion, and fear, bursting at times into hatreds and war. In our time science and technology are making the world one at the material level: the emergent unity of mankind into a common consciousness, even if it does not require the artificial unification of all men's religions into a debased eclecticism, certainly demands the end of mutual ignorance and suspicion, the advance of mutual knowledge.

How does the Christian approach this problem of inter-religious understanding? During the spring of 1967 I had a series of free-ranging discussions about many aspects of this question with Canon Horace Dammers, of Coventry Cathedral. A leading figure in the British Christian Unity movement, Canon Dammers originated the idea of all the Churches in Britain uniting by 1980, and in his book *A.D. 1980* relates such Christian unity to wider issues, including "the reconciliation of religion to religion." His concern for the latter derives from nearly five years spent in South India, during 1953–7, as chaplain-lecturer at St. John's College, Palayamkottai, where students were drawn from the Hindu, Islamic, and Christian faiths. While in India, Canon Dammers was a presbyter of the united Church of South India. Now he is an Anglican priest and education officer at the new Coventry Cathedral. The following is a summary of the main themes of our conversations on understanding between Christian and the other major religions, with particular reference to the situation in India as experienced by Christians from the West.

COOPER: Let us begin by agreeing that Christianity should not start from a viewpoint of "This is the Truth: come and get it" but rather pro-

ceed in humble dialogue with other faiths. In practice in the college situation, how did such dialogue occur?

DAMMERS: India is a secular state permitting full freedom of worship. South India, especially, with its large numbers of Christians and long tradition of Christianity, has a very tolerant atmosphere between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians. The former can, and do, attend Christian worship; furthermore, the academic syllabus of the Christian College includes "religious instruction" for Christian students which those of other faiths can attend with parental permission and "moral instruction" classes for those who are not Christian, and I found that dialogue between the religions often occurred in these courses. To have students and staff of differing faiths discussing, e.g., the significance of Mohammed, the Buddha, and St. Francis helped everyone to sort out what he held. Even when studying Shakespeare's *Richard II* matters of faith cropped up: comparisons of the traditional religious sanction for the *status quo* in both Britain and India were important. A nation's literature reveals its spiritual background.

COOPER: Did you find that inter-faith dialogue was conducted mainly on specifically religious questions, or more indirectly through social questions?

DAMMERS: I found little specifically religious dialogue at student level — that was more usual among staff — but a great willingness to discuss the religious basis of political and social questions, e.g., Western individualism as contrasted with Hindu family solidarity, as shown in contrasting attitudes to marriage; or the meaning of political integrity. Among young people of differing religions, I think this "practical" approach is the most valuable one for dialogue. Of course, sometimes more specifically religious issues were discussed, such as Hindu and Christian understandings of compassion.

COOPER: On the question of Christian-Hindu dialogue, what do you consider the points of similarity, even unity, between Christianity and Hinduism?

DAMMERS: Both derive from a common humanity, a common stance of awe and love before what Rudolf Otto called the "*mysterium tremendum et fascinans*." Christ said, "Man cannot live by bread alone": Hindus would agree. Gandhi said, "God dare not come to a starving man except in the form of bread": Christians would agree. Christians and Hindus alike commend goodness, gentleness, courage, temperance, reverence for life, respect for both young and old, peaceableness, courtesy, and other moral and personal virtues. They also deplore a parallel range of vices. Hinduism contains within it elements of personal devotion to God (*Bhakti*) which are in some respects analogous to Christian devotion to the person of Christ.

COOPER: What do you think are some of the main differences between Christianity and Hinduism?

DAMMERS: As a Christian, I would state some of these differences in the light of central Christian affirmations, as follows:

(a) Christians believe in One God. Hindus tolerate polytheism within their system.

(b) Christians believe God to be personal, calling Him Father. Hindus believe an impersonal apprehension of Deity to be loftier than a personal one.

(c) Christians believe in "one Lord Jesus Christ." Hindus do not.

(d) Christians believe in the Holy Spirit as active and personal. The Hindu ideal of the supreme God is that to which you can attribute nothing.

(e) Christians believe in resurrection. Hindus believe in immortality.

(f) Christians associate sin with moral failure. Hindus tend to associate it with religious failure.

COOPER: Is Christianity a "historical religion" in a sense in which Hinduism is not? Do they have different understandings of time?

DAMMERS: I understand that the historicity of the *Rāmāyaṇa,* for example, is not an issue for Hindus, whereas the historicity of the life and death and real humanity of Jesus is crucial to Christians. This essential difference is reflected in different attitudes to history and to time generally. Christians attach primary significance to history and to the world of space and time. Hindus tend to subordinate this whole realm to the eternal, and even to dismiss it as illusory. Hindus have in general a cyclical view of time and Christians a linear view of time.

COOPER: Bearing in mind these areas of similarity and difference, let us consider *the* basic question. How can the devout and convinced Christian, Hindu, or whatever, act for inter-religious understanding and the spiritual unity of all men, and yet at the same time not compromise what he personally holds to be the highest Truth?

DAMMERS: Dialogue must not involve compromise, unless it is in the admission that both parties are seekers, on the way to fullness of Truth. Dialogue cannot be genuine unless personal assurance is based on faith — existential knowledge — not purely intellectual knowledge. There must be a proper meeting of persons for real dialogue.

We stand side by side in dialogue, facing Truth. We stand thus together, looking at the same Truth, and we get different images. We are both on a voyage of discovery. We must ask each other: "What is your idea of God?" We must ask each other further questions; if necessary, the Christian must take the initiative in asking for the Hindu view of Christian beliefs. In a very deep sense, *the way of reconciliation is through the*

pursuit of opposites. Hindus can hold together what Christians believe to be opposites. For example: some Hindus are virtually monotheists; most Hindus are polytheists. Therefore in his dialogue with the Hindu the Christian will seek to define what can and cannot be rationally held together by a single individual or within a single system. For example, he will ask, "Can God be both One and Many?" and seek to establish his own belief that He cannot and that these are in fact opposites. If the Christian can once establish that, then and only then can the question be asked: "Is God One or is He Many?"

We must avoid the temptation of "a common front of religions." It is through a common concern — from differing religious bases — for the secular questions of humanity that dialogue will begin and develop, and it will grow from there as, in mutual tolerance and humility, men of differing faiths bring their own understanding's approach to the definition and experience of Truth. To me as a Christian, the realistic pursuit of differences must play an important part, as also must an element of genuine doubt about God. Christians must also firmly reject, of course, any notion of possessing all truth: we are seeking Christ, and would say that all men who are seeking Truth are seeking Him, though non-Christians would not see it that way.

This discussion has tried to start some guide-lines, from the Christian viewpoint, for inter-faith dialogue. Mankind's main spiritual stirrings broadly divide between the two great Judaic-Christian-Islamic and Hindu-Buddhist-Jain religio-philosophical streams. Within and across these two traditions dialogue can only be fruitful. For the Christian, especially at this time of *Honest to God* theological ferment, undoubtedly much can be learnt from other great Faiths. Dr. E. G. Parrinder recently pointed out that many questions currently debated by Christians in the West, especially about the kind of imagery we may use about the Deity, "are not new at all, but have been debated many times already in other cultures and other religions."[1] The universal religious experience seems to teach us that an understanding of God as transcendent is structured in the very nature of Man and the Universe. The concept of Deity's self-revelation to men is another apparent universal whose forms, e.g., Hindu *Avatara* or Christian "Incarnation," though differing considerably, offer much scope for dialogue leading to a mutually deeper comprehension of this truth. A single world religion seems at present not feasible even if it were desirable — but certainly a common spiritual awareness is emerging

[1] Dr. E. G. Parrinder, Lecturer in Comparative Religion at London University, spoke on this theme at the London Branch of the Indian Institute of World Culture, on 26 April 1967.

across the globe, as universals are recognized, and as humble inter-dependence between the great religions gradually replaces erstwhile bitter rivalry. Such humility is indeed the spirit of the Founder of the Christian Faith. In that spirit, we Christians in the West must be ready to accept "light from the East." We hope and believe we have light for the East.*

BRIAN G. COOPER

Horizons

The vision splendid
Is ended
In failure or success,
No happiness
Is found in chasing dreams
Fragile as moonbeams
Dissolving at a touch,
Too much
With ardent eyes
I scanned far skies,
I scorned the fruitful fields
And all the rich earth yields
Responsive to the toil
Of simple men who love the soil,
Too late, too late, I see
The stark futility
Of seeking false delight
In what seemed at first sight
Alluring, fine,
Exhilarating like wine;
Illusion's birds have flown,
Yet thanks to my despair
I breathe a purer air.

HERBERT BLUEN

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* SUGGESTED READING:

A. C. BOUQUET: *The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions* (London, 1958); DOM A. GRAHAM: *Zen Catholicism* (London, 1964); T. LING, *Buddha, Marx, and God* (London, 1966); G. PARRINDER: *The Christian Debate: Light from the East* (London, 1964); S. NEILL: *Christian Faith and Other Faiths* (London, 1960); S. RADHAKRISHNAN: *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (Oxford, 1939); N. SMART: *A Dialogue of Religions* (London, 1960); P. THOMAS: *Christians and Christianity in India and Pakistan* (London, 1954); K. WALKER: *Diagnosis of Man* (London, 1962)

S. G. SATHAYE

Morals in the *Rigveda*

[We welcome this brief but sound and substantial contribution from Dr. S. G. Sathaye, PH.D., at present Senior Lecturer in Social Philosophy, Department of Languages and Social Science, Lanchester College of Technology, Coventry. He is the author of *A Philosophy of Living — An Introduction to Ethics* and has contributed articles to the *Calcutta Review*. In this article he documents exactly his view that the *Ṛgveda* implies and presents a highly evolved view of morality with a special stress on personal responsibility and friendship between human beings.—ED.]

H. H. WILSON writes in the Introduction to his translation of the *Ṛgveda* that in the Vedic Hymns "there is little demand for moral benefactions" and that "the main objects of the prayers, however, are benefits of a more worldly and physical character." The Hindus of that period are regarded as practitioners of nature worship, and their religious values are construed as ideological superstructures resting on their basic material needs for food, shelter, and clothing. Such a quasi-Marxist interpretation does not do justice to the period, and is not borne out by a closer study of the *Ṛgveda*. In *Anuvāka* VII of the First *Maṇḍala* of this Veda we find a prayer to Agni (God of Fire), seeking not merely for opulence but also for right understanding. The idea of communion with gods is heavily stressed in the body of this Veda, and seems to be overlooked by interpreters such as Wilson.

The *Ṛgveda* is not merely a "bread and butter" philosophy. It contains recognition of the idea of sin, the significance of repentance, and the distinction between right and wrong. Gods are considered devoid of sin and full of intrinsic worth. They are not mere dealers, nor are they bought by acts of lip-service to their prowess.[1] Sincerity in devotion is regarded as essential. Now the recognition of sin and of repentance reveals the fundamental moral concept of personal responsibility for action and implies the possibility of choosing. "Let us not suffer for the sins committed by another," says verse VI.5.2.7. This verse does not accept the principle of substitutionary punishment but holds the offender responsible for his crime. It does not put the blame on society or on any ruling deity, and calls for no scapegoat to absorb punishment on behalf of the offender. Doing the will of God, or following a divine rule, is regarded as a personal responsibility. This does not involve the reduction of the follower of the rule to the status of an instrument, for it is his choice to accept or reject the rule, and it is this factor of choice which brings out the reality of sin. Sin has to be repented of, and is not merely to be dismissed as an

illusion, to get back into God's favour. The *Ṛgveda,* therefore, shows a realistic attitude to the problem of morals and implies the reality of interpersonal relationships.

Just as sin and punishment are connected in the mind of the worshipper so is virtue and reward. Agni is said to render "all pious acts productive of reward"[2] and the reward of virtue is happiness in material and spiritual terms. Abundant food and right understanding are asked for as rewards of sincere prayers and sacrifices. The connection of virtue and happiness conceived in this way rules out a purely hedonistic interpretation of the Vedic hymns. To interpret the *Ṛgveda* in completely hedonistic or utilitarian terms would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy, and also to forget that the *Ṛgveda* admitted values besides that of pleasure. "... vigorous Agni, let us not sit down before thee devoid of sons, of beauty, of devotion," says a worshipper in hymn VII.1.4.6.

It would be quite untenable to say that there is little demand for moral benefactions in the Vedic hymns, especially when one reads verses which say, for example, "The wise have established seven rules of conduct; he is a sinner who deviates from any one of them," or "Gods are prayed to to keep the worshippers along the right path or the good path." Virtues and vices, then, are not determined in terms of likes and dislikes, but in accordance with the rules of the wise. What these seven rules are is not quite clear, but truthfulness in speech, and sincerity and spontaneity in action are virtues repeatedly mentioned in many hymns.[3] Selfish conduct is condemned and altruism is held in high regard. Verse VII.2.5.19 reads: "May I daily distribute wealth to the venerable wherever abiding." This probably is the content of right understanding in the social context, at which a worshipper is aiming. Condemnation of malice, avarice, miserliness and praise of generosity, honesty, good will, firmness of character are clearly evidenced in many hymns.[4]

The Ṛgvedic thought seems to gain in breadth and depth as one proceeds from the First to the Tenth *Maṇḍala.* Obviously the work is spread over many centuries, and is enriched by intervening experience and reasoning. In the earlier part the most noticeable emphasis is on communion of believers, who are called Aryans, and on condemnation of unbelievers who are called Dasyus. Later the Aryan community is open-eyed enough to realize that even within its own fold there are vicious characters and invokes the help of gods to weaken their evil powers.[5] There is, however, at this stage still a dogma that Dasyus cannot be moral, because they do not perform rites which the Aryans prescribe.

Then again there is a reference in the earlier *Maṇḍalas* of the *Ṛgveda* to five classes of men or five races of men. In the earlier part of the Tenth

Maṇḍala two castes are clearly distinguished on the basis of the presence or absence of religious wisdom. Later in the same *Maṇḍala* the *Ṛgveda* shows how Brahmanas are the mouth, Rajanyas the arms, Vaishyas the thighs, and Shudras the feet of *Puruṣa*. Despite the organic analogy used here in connection with the origin of castes the *Ṛgveda* ends on a grand personal note, when it exhorts all "to meet together," "to talk together," "to apprehend alike," "to have common intention, common thoughts and common wishes so that there may be a thorough union among all."

It is interesting to note that gods themselves are viewed not merely as physical elements such as fire, wind, rain, but as persons. Men, as we have seen before, were also regarded as persons, and not as instruments of gods. Gods were often invoked as friends of men. Whatever perfections they possessed were human virtues in idealized forms. This idea of fellowship between gods and men, it would be reasonable to suppose, was but an extension of what they experienced through friendship among fellow beings. Unless the Vedic men had first realized and appreciated personal relationships in the context of friendship, their looking upon gods as friends would be a matter of mystery. Even at the end of the Tenth *Maṇḍala,* where the origin of society is traced to one God, He is not construed as an impersonal and abstract entity, but is significantly called *Puruṣa* or Person. Thus Personalism lies at the very root of the Ṛgvedic morality.

The concern for social morality is evinced in the act of worship which is public.[6] Verse 1.6.4.10 invokes Jarabodha to enter into oblation for the completion of the sacrifice that benefits all mankind. Thinking and acting in universal terms is as old as the *Ṛgveda.* We, of the current period, are therefore not the first in the field to talk about universal morality and international understanding.

Apart from friendship with gods, the *Ṛgveda* sings the praises of friendship among human beings. "He who has abandoned the friend who knows the duty of a friend, in his speech there is not a particle (of sense)," says verse x.6.3.6., or again, "He is not a friend who gives not food to a friend, to an associate, to a companion," proclaims another verse.

Hospitality is regarded as the best virtue in human relationships. "The inhospitable man acquires food in vain. I speak the truth — it verily is his death. He cherishes not Aryaman nor a friend. He who eats alone is nothing but a sinner," declares verse x.10.5.6. Sharing one's food with a fellow being is not mere economic distribution of material goods, but is tantamount to sharing the very being of personality and amounts to communion in the deeper sense. The emphasis on friendship has, therefore, a profound significance in the *Ṛgveda.*

If the act of friendship is the foundation of active morality, if through it one appreciates the sense of personal responsibility in thought, feeling, and action, as well as the principles of equality, freedom, and mutuality in society, then the locus of international understanding must surely lie in this act. We may disagree with the contents of the Ṛgvedic morality, we may criticize it for not giving us a formal analysis of personality, we may blame it for entertaining a narrow view of communion in its earlier stages, but we cannot help feeling that it has finally caught the right spirit of morality in giving pride of place to the practical concept of friendship. If this spirit guides the Aryan path, who can gainsay that it has relevance to the pilgrimage of life today?*

S. G. SATHAYE

Do all the good you can,
In all the ways you can,
In all the places you can,
At all the times you can,
To all the people you can,
As long as ever you can.

—JOHN WESLEY

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*REFERENCES: This article is based on the reading of *Rgveda* as translated by H H. Wilson. Individual references to quotations and allusions are given below:

1. See Verse 1.7.3.3 and verse 1.20.4·5
2. See Verse 1.12.6.4
3. See verses 1.12.3.4; 1.18.3.6; 1.19.3·7; VIII.6.4.20; IX. 7.10.4; 1·23.10.11
4. See verses IV.1.3.13; IV.5.4.5; IV.5.4.8; IV.5.4.6; IV.1.5.11; V.6.13.8; 1·12 9.7; 1·23·10·11
5. See Verse IV·3·2·3.
6. See Vol. I, Verse 1·13·7·9; Vol. IV, Verse IV.1.7.4; Vol. IV, Verse VII·3·20·1

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

The Nature of Aesthetic Judgement

[The first part of this long article by Dr. Arthur L. Herman of the Department of Philosophy, Wisconsin State University, U.S.A., appeared in our October 1967 issue. The second part printed below turns to the view of beauty implicit in Hindu and Buddhist religious art. The third and concluding part appears next month.—ED.]

II : A Pragmatic Criterion of Beauty

IN OPPOSITION TO the objective and subjective theories of aesthetic judgement presented in Part I, I want to place a theory of Hindu-Buddhist origin. I want to undertake the analysis of this theory in both Part II and Part III for no other purpose than to point out a particular aesthetic view which, unlike the objective and subjective theories discussed in Part I, has a consistency and reasonableness about it which is worth looking into.

The theory is most clearly represented in Tibetan art, but because of the close philosophical ties between the religion of Tibet, a form of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and Hinduism, I want to begin with a brief discussion of Hindu metaphysics, a metaphysics accepted in certain essential respects by the Mahāyāna Buddhists. I want then to show how Tibetan art, at least as described by one commentator, relates to this metaphysic.

Let me begin with an outline of the metaphysic necessary to this aesthetic theory. The Hindus believe in the existence of a transcendent Divine Power called *Brahman,* and an immanent Divine Power referred to as *Ātman.* The goal or aim of life in Hinduism is to "know," in some sense of that word, that the *Ātman* indwelling in each man is identical with the *Brahman* which transcends the universe. This goal of life is called *Mokṣa* — that moment in which the identity between *Brahman* and *Ātman* is known. Further, they believe that a veil of illusion or *māyā* covers or conceals this identity. They are Platonists in this dualistic sense, then, for they believe that it is *māyā* as a kind of ignorance which confounds man and makes him accept the false world of appearances for that true knowledge of the Real, the identity between *Ātman* and *Brahman.* The problem for Plato as well as the Hindus is to pierce this world of mere appearance and apprehend the Real which lies behind it, causally and ontologically, either as the eternal forms (Plato) or as the true identity of *Ātman* and *Brahman* (the Hindus). This is where art enters in — it is an aid to meditation by which one comes to know that Real.

Subjective enjoyment in the form of sensuous titillation (cf., the woman

with the notebook) and objective properties in the art work (cf., the artist-judge mentioned previously) are both useless as criteria of beauty as far as the Hindu aesthetic is concerned. The Hindus, as I am interpreting them here at any rate, are pragmatists when it comes to art: the work of art is "beautiful" if it is successful in removing ignorance and penetrating to the Real.

Plato said, "Art is a reminder," and he meant apparently that art is a way by which recollection takes place. The beauty in the painting serves as a clue by which men recollect that eternal form, Beauty, which was known in some sense before their birth. Similarly, with the Hindus, the art object is a chink in the wall of *māyā* by which one can peep into the beyond, and escape from the shallow world of appearance. The artist is looked upon as the one who will tear away the veil which now blinds the worshipper, a theory not lost apparently in the West, as is seen in the aesthetic theories of Henry Bergson and his apologist, T. S. Hulme. In his book *Bergson's Theory of Art,* Hulme states:

> The creative activity of the artist is only necessary because of the limitations placed on internal and external perception by the necessities of action. If we could break through the veil which action interposes, if we could come into direct contact with sense and consciousness, art would be useless and unnecessary. Our eyes, aided by memory, would carve out in space and fix in time the most inimitable of pictures. In the centre of one's own mind, we should hear constantly a certain music. But as this is impossible, the function of the artist is to pierce through here and there, accidentally as it were, the veil placed between us and reality by the limitations of our perception engendered by action.

According to this pragmatic theory, we are not dealing with beauty *per se* as much as with success. If an art object works, i.e., if it reveals the eternal, then it is good or beautiful. If it is not successful, then it ought to be discarded. The West has a parallel, I suspect; the images in the Church, the rosary, the cross, and so forth, are objective focal points on which to fix the attention while worshipping. In line with this, I should imagine that a cross or a statue of Kṛṣṇa or Śiva would be more successful, more useful for the religious devotee, than a bottle of ink, a nude by Rubens, or a painting by Jackson Pollock, though I have no evidence for this statement. Thus, if a work of art works at all, it works well, that is, it either gets one through the veil of *māyā* and reveals God or *Brahman* or the Real, or it does not.

An outstanding example of this view of the judgement of art is to be found in a book by Marco Pallis called *Peaks and Lamas.* Pallis is concerned with the Mahāyāna Buddhist culture of Tibet and particularly the

art of that culture (this is before the coming of the Chinese Communists). He states:

> All the arts are in some measure interchangeable as aids to memory or supports of the same doctrine: they are all called upon to play their part according to circumstances. (p. 350)

The part they all play is to prepare the people for an end identical with the one spoken of in our short introduction to Hindu aesthetic, namely *Nirvāṇa* (or *Mokṣa* as the Hindus called it). *Nirvāṇa* is a kind of knowing and, in this case, it is a knowing of Divine Reality and an identification of the worshipper with that Reality:

> The aim of ritual — and ritual must be regarded as a synthesis of all the arts, acting as the handmaids of Doctrine and collaborating towards one end — is to prepare people for metaphysical realization; to spur them on to pierce the veil of the finite, and to seek Deliverance in Knowledge — that is, in identification with the Supreme and Infinite Reality. (*Ibid.*, p. 351)

The sacred art objects are part of the method by which one achieves this ultimate goal of *Nirvāṇa*.

> To attain to Wisdom, mere wishing is not sufficient, there must also be Method: that is why ... these two, Method and Wisdom, are represented as an eternally inseparable pair and are said to be "married." So we, dwellers under the veil of form, make use of ritual or art, a part of Method; since it is a most useful instrument for form to use in the attempt to pierce a loophole and look out towards non-form, the next veil curtaining us off from the Supreme Reality. (*Ibid.*, p. 351)

This method, whereby art is used as a ladder of the doctrine, has further implications which ought to be pointed out, and which will, I believe, juxtapose it sharply with the objective and subjective theories pointed to in Part I of this paper. Those two previous theories of aesthetic judgement are part of the pure-art theories rife in the West today, where art for art's sake, or academic art, as it is sometimes called, serves no other function than that of affording "aesthetic pleasure" to the viewer. Both of the persons met at the art show who upheld these theories found art enjoyable and discovered that it gave them pleasure: there was no other reason for looking at the paintings in the art show, as far as they were concerned, other than the fact that the works shown there gave them aesthetic delight, even though the reasons for the delight varied considerably. The paintings were enjoyed purely for their own sake, and not because they gave the viewer knowledge about the world, or an insight into the peculiar but agonized psychology of the painter or themselves,

or made them want to vote in the next election, or any other such notion. Western art today is characterized by this disinterested, dispassionate, and detached approach. Tibetan art, on the other hand, is not "enjoyed" in any sense of the term but, rather, "used."

> Ritual, contrary to the assertions of some Western writers, is not thought of as being efficacious in its own right, i.e., as pure art, or art for art's sake — such a notion is included in the catalogue of obstacles to Enlightenment by the Buddha — but it remains strictly a means of exercising the mind and sharpening the perceptions, of providing for each of the senses its appropriate "supports," and as a help to canalizing attention towards the point desired. (*Ibid.*, pp. 351-2)

And that point, as Pallis has stated, is *Nirvāṇa*.

It is in terms of the success of art then, as a method of leading the worshipper to the end towards which the Doctrine is aiming, that the criteria of aesthetic judgement are to be found. As Pallis says:

> To one man one method is profitable, to his neighbour a second, according to their respective mentalities. [By "method" here are meant the various art forms — painting, images, the spoken word, mystery plays, etc.] That which harmonizes with metaphysical truth and leads naturally towards it is good art; that which is rightly called inartistic betrays itself by its lack of meaning and therefore by its defectiveness as a means; the utilitarian purpose and the symbolical significance of a work must go hand-in-hand, otherwise it will contain contradictory implications which, if followed out to the end, will logically lead to chaos. (p. 352)

The artist is in this sense, then, a mediator between the people and the pure spirit of the Doctrine (the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine), transmitting his own knowledge to the people (a notion similar to many Western theories of artistic expression, notably T. S. Eliot and R. G. Collingwood). An identical approach is found in the Hindu concept of artistic expression and the Western medieval theory of art as expounded by Ananda K. Coomaraswamy.* It differs from the modern Western theory of artistic expression in that it is not an emotion which is being expressed in the work of art, but rather an intellectual form. Thus Coomaraswamy states in his monograph *Is Art a Superstition or a Way of Life*:

> Art can then be defined as the embodiment in material of a preconceived form. The artist's operation is dual, in the first place intellectual or "free," and in the second place manual and "servile." ("To be properly expressed," as Eckhart says, "a thing must proceed from within, moved by its form.") ... It is just as necessary that the idea of the work to be

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* See the excellent book by Ray Livingston, *The Traditional Theory of Literature*. Dr. Livingston has written the best analysis to date of Coomaraswamy's theory of art.

done should first of all be imagined in an imitable form as that the workman should command the technique by which this mental image can be imitated in the available material. "It is," as Augustine says, "by their ideas that we judge of what things ought to be like."

One of the most important points which both Pallis and Coomaraswamy have raised for us here, in addition to the notion of artistic expression and the utility of all traditional art, is the fact of the great difference which exists between modern Western and Eastern theories of art: most modern Western art is sensational (of the senses), emotional, and sentimental; most Eastern art, i.e., the art of Tibet and India, would appear to be primarily intellectual, ideational, and didactic.

If some types of Oriental art are intellectual and didactic perhaps one could derive some kind of test to discover the *manner* of their conceptual transmission. However, since Pallis speaks of these forms and ideas as metaphysical, it might be impossible to talk about the "ideas" to the satisfaction of any follower of this doctrine. Since we are handicapped semantically, the next best thing might, of course, be to test the *results* of the conceptual transmission produced by these works of art. That is to say, since there is bound to be quibbling over what is being transmitted conceptually through sacred art, and since very few persons attempt analyses of metaphysical concepts like "intellectual forms," "revelation of the real," and "ideational properties," it might be wise to focus our attention on the results, the success or utility, of this sacred art. If, as they claim, art leads one to certain practical ends it should be possible to take such a theory of art and apply to it a test which would once and for all decide the issue of the meaningfulness or practicableness of all metaphysico-pragmatic theories of art. If a work of art is used, as Pallis suggests, to carry the worshipper into a realm of Reality heretofore closed to him, then it ought to be possible hypothetically to experiment with a set of art works in order to determine which ones work and which do not, i.e., to determine which art objects are the best of their kind, or "beautiful" in the sense described in Part I of this paper. The test we have devised for this pragmatic theory of art will concern itself, however, with a moral rather than a metaphysical work of art. In Part III I want to describe such a test and the implications that it has for the art theory we have been discussing here in Part II.

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

(*To be concluded*)

NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE

Edward Thomas: 1878–1917

[Our old Friend Mr. Neville Braybrooke pays a brief and delicate tribute to the memory of the English writer and poet Edward Thomas, the fiftieth anniversary of whose death falls this year.—ED.]

WHEN Edward Thomas was killed at Arras fifty years ago, "a mirror of England was shattered." The words are those of Walter de la Mare. The two men had been good friends for some years, and when de la Mare's *Peacock Pie* had come Thomas's way as a critic, he had regarded it as one of the two "finds" in a reviewer's lifetime. (The other was Robert Frost's second book of verse, *North of Boston*).

Thomas had married while still an Oxford undergraduate and he was a father before he took his degree. He came to London determined to support his family by literary criticism, but soon discovered that this in effect involved him in compiling anthologies, editing standard authors, and writing numerous reviews. Sometimes he was compelled to read as many as a dozen books in a week. At one period he toyed with the idea of trying his hand at the novel but decided that he lacked the necessary powers of invention. In prose his talent was essentially that of an essayist, and to his descriptions of the English and Welsh countryside he brought a supreme sensibility. Something that he noticed about George Borrow could be applied to himself:

> He succeeds not only in evoking things that are very much alive, but in suggesting an artist that is their equal instead of one who, like so many more refined writers, is [merely] a ... pathetic admirer of things.

Poverty and hardship frequently forced Thomas to write to order. A book on Marlborough — "the duke, alas, not the town" — he completed within two months, and, by any standard, it remains a remarkable performance. Insufficient attention has been paid to his ability to work both incredibly fast and accurately. Too often, some of his thirty books have been regarded as no more than competent hack jobs. Keeping constant deadlines for editors had trained him how to concentrate his thought, and there is an immense professionalism about every manuscript which he delivered to a publisher — whether the subject was one of his own choosing, as with his book about *Richard Jefferies* (1909), or a commission, as was more usually the case. For instance, his guide-book *The Isle of Wight* (1911) includes not only an admirable summary of the island's history but also a number of observations that lift it to a level far surpassing the rest of the volumes in the same series. A passage that has stood well the

test of time describes the walk along the coast between Bonchurch and Shanklin:

> In the course of years the landslip has been overgrown with trees and flowers, and become a tumult of twisted oaks among rocks all upheaved and broken into caves and hillocks in a fashion which an old countryman of my acquaintance would call "Gothic." The oaks are twisted as if conceived during the landslip.

That last sentence, so apparently simple at first sight but so rewarding to ponder, has the intensity of a line in a poem. Moreover, it was Robert Frost who first showed Thomas how much of his prose could be turned into poetry with only a minimum of transposition. And, looking back on the 140 poems that he wrote during his last three years ("Did anyone ever begin at thirty-six in the shade?"), time and again there can be recognized that precision and economy of style which distinguished his prose. But with the change to poetry there comes a development and crystallization of his vision. His widow referred to it as "a kind of spiritual and intellectual fulfilment." The ambling tone of the earlier essays becomes more concentrated in essence. A poem on "October" ends:

> ... now I might
> As happy be as earth is beautiful,
> Were I some other or with earth could turn
> In alternation of violet and rose,
> Harebell and snowdrop, at their season due,
> And gorse that has no time to be gay.
> But if this be not happiness, — who knows?
> Some day I shall think this is a happy day,
> And this mood by the name melancholy
> Shall no more blackened and obscured be.

"Edward Thomas was a war poet who died in battle." The yellowing newspaper statement remains true as far as it goes. Indeed, when he joined the Artists Rifles in 1916 and Eleanor Farjeon asked him what he was fighting for, he picked up a handful of earth, crumbled it between his finger and thumb, and replied: "Literally, for this." Certainly he was a patriot who was proud of his Welsh and English ancestry — and prepared to defend it with his life's blood; but within him was another man whom poetry released — a man who could question in a quiet, compelling voice the death of a private, once a Wiltshire ploughman, killed in France, or who could look at a bundle of hazel and ash faggots, and muse:

> ... they will never warm me, though they must
> Light several Winter's fires. Before they are done

> The war will have ended, many other things
> Have ended, maybe, that I can no more
> Foresee or more control than robin and wren.

Such lines offer no violent jingoism, no exaggerated rhetoric. They are, in their own fashion, the best epitaph. And perhaps too, the feeling that they articulate is one that has grown more marked as the events of the First World War have receded into the past. For there is about these lines that end "Fifty Faggots" a prophetic note that seems not only to foreshadow the poet's death, but which reaches out beyond a personal context and speaks for all soldiers still going to war. One of his last books to be published during his lifetime was a study of Keats — a poet who had said that a man should not shout or dispute but whisper results to his neighbour. That is what Edward Thomas's poems have done for fifty years. On the evening that he fell at Arras, the sergeant of his company has related, earlier there was singing and dancing among the troops because the Germans had retreated and they thought they had won the war. But when later he went out and called to them, "Men, we've lost our best officer," the cry went up: "Not Mr. Thomas?" And there was no more shouting that day.

NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE

> And only the Master shall praise us,
> and only the Master shall blame;
> And no one shall work for money,
> and no one shall work for fame;
>
> But each for the joy of working,
> and each, in his separate star,
> Shall draw the Thing as he sees It,
> for the God of Things as They Are!
>
> —RUDYARD KIPLING

DAVID GUNSTON

Can There Be Life in Space?

[Mr. David Gunston brings together the interesting views of experts in several disciplines on the possibility of life in space. The consensus is that the presence of life in space is extremely probable but that its forms there may easily be quite unlike any forms we know at present.—ED.]

AFTER ages of speculation, and over a century of colourful science fiction, scientists are now beginning to give serious consideration to all the implications of the supremely fascinating question: can there really be life in space?

Can any of the myriads of so-called heavenly bodies, the suns, moons, and planets of our own solar system, plus the untold numbers of systems and galaxies beyond, have life on them? Or are we utterly alone in the universe?

There took place recently in California the world's first symposium or conference of top experts to study this question. Some three hundred space engineers, biologists, geologists, and astronomers got together under the auspices of the American Astronautical Society for three days of concentrated discussion on the chances of extra-terrestrial life existing at this moment. Religious and philosophical leaders were also invited to add their views on the far-reaching implications of some forms of life existing in other worlds than our own.

Of course, no firm conclusions could be drawn, but many interesting views were aired, and the general opinion was that life in space is probable. It is possible that we are alone in all creation, but highly improbable. Life in some form or other, perhaps of a kind completely unknown to us, must have evolved in other worlds much as it evolved here.

These were not idle speculations, but the measured views of men whose working lives are devoted to some aspect of the problem. Presiding over the conference, Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, of the California Institute of Technology, stressed that although men have puzzled over the heavens all through history, we are only now just beginning to fathom the first mysteries of what lies beyond our own puny solar system, or indeed in it. "When I contemplate the eventual possibility of finding life elsewhere," he said, "I am reminded of the cartoon where one character is saying to the other: 'Sometimes I think we are alone, and sometimes I think we're not. In either case, it's a staggering thought.'"

So staggering, in fact, that few human beings have even begun to grasp the full implications either way. This recent meeting has tried to mould our minds into the necessary state of receptivity.

For instance, Dr. Harlow Shapley, Harvard University astronomer, whilst admitting that "the conquest of space is one of the greatest challenges since the beginning of human curiosity," was at pains to stress that existing life may just not be similar to our own. Of some hundred thousand planets in our own galaxy thought to be adequate for life of the human type, he doubted if any had evolved life much like our own. "The chances are a million-to-one against man's development exactly as on earth. Expecting us to be reproduced elsewhere is a vain sort of thing."

Yet Dr. Shapley admitted that there is every probability that organic life has already developed "on a great many planets in a great many galaxies." Such life may well be intelligent, but not necessarily in a human way. Much depends on exactly what we mean (or think we mean) by intelligent life.

> Man may think he is very intelligent [said Dr. Shapley], but there's a kind of ant that takes a piece of leaf and carries it down below ground to use as fertilizer for a fungus his species cultivates. They've been doing that for thirty million years — but we humans have only comparatively recently developed agriculture in our civilization.
>
> My definition of intelligence [he went on] is the ability to react to stimuli.

By that token, many of the forms of life that may exist in space will definitely prove to be intelligent, but, again, in ways foreign to us.

According to another scientist, Dr. Bernard M. Oliver, the number of highly-developed civilizations in the universe, all at different degrees of progress or formation, may well be of the order of a million. He is more concerned with the immense difficulties of communicating with any of them. "That man will not attempt to contact the nearest of these ... is to me unthinkable. The only questions are when and how."

So it is clear we have to re-adjust our thinking a good deal before we can start to consider what life in space really means. To start with, as a general rule, communication by radio-waves is the only feasible method for most other possibly inhabited bodies, since space-ships as they are being envisaged now would take forty thousand years and more to reach even a handful of the "nearer" stars.

The only solution, says Dr. Frank D. Drake of Cornell University, is to "look for signals used by civilizations for their own purposes," and then try to crack the radio "code" in use. This may not prove so difficult as might be thought, since the basis of all known possible message-sending is the mathematical language used by earthly science. "It won't be easy," said Dr. Drake, "and it will require computers of great complexity to sort out the signals from the background 'noise' in the universe." So future

communication with extra-terrestrial civilizations, if they exist, seems likely to be a kind of impersonal, mathematical radio-telephone link-up round space. But this would be adventurous as well as puzzling, to say the least, since Dr. Drake is of the belief that "just in our galaxy, perhaps one civilization comes into being every year — at least, one star is formed per year. But other solar systems leave the scene, blow themselves up, or otherwise disappear with about the same frequency."

Even if we discover any form of life, whether intelligent or not, on worlds visited by human spacemen within the foreseeable future, will we be able to communicate with it — or even recognize it? According to Dr. John C. Lilly, world expert at communicating with dolphins, only if we cast off our own "anthropocentric arrogance" and look at all creatures we many encounter "with the eyes of a child." There may, in fact, be whole "systems of thinking" we shall not be able to cope with at first.

On the physical level, too, immense difficulties may be met. How does one communicate with a being which "thinks" entirely in the form of radio or other electro-magnetic waves, lacking all need for sight, speech, or hearing? How does a man communicate with a creature whose eye might be half-a-mile across, or whose brain had to be bigger than a city block in order to survive in its particular environment? How would any space traveller even be aware of highly developed microscopic life, especially if it existed below ground or under water?

The possibilities of speculation are immense. According to the Rev. John Lynch, of Fordham University, we might find some of our neighbours in space to have "survived the test to acknowledge God's supremacy, and be living a far happier existence than our own." Others, he added, might have failed, and we could expect them "to be much like ourselves."

The last word at this significant conference went to philosopher Max Lerner. He saw the whole urge for space exploration as "very much a part of our time, reflecting the hunger for human connection." Despite the sophistication of our physical communications on earth today, "we are still lonely and estranged." For him, the question "is not whether there is intelligent life in space but: Is there intelligent life down here on earth?"

Which, when all is said and done, is quite a question.

DAVID GUNSTON

New Books and Old

An Introduction to Goethe*

THIS highly original book is meant to be an introduction to Goethe for the student as well as for the general reader. Special attention is paid to the *Leiden des jungen Werther, Faust, Wilhelm Meister, Wahlverwandtschaften,* and *Der West-Östliche Divan,* etc. One of the key-problems in Ronald Gray's refreshingly provocative and suggestive study is the paradox in Goethe's life and work, i.e., all-embracingness and renunciation, self-assertion and self-abnegation, community and isolation. This Goethean polarity is reflected in many artistic presentations, e.g., in the *Wahlverwandtschaften*, which is seen as an "attempt at transcending the situation of Werther" by linking the greatest passion with the greatest renunciation.

There are a number of sagacious observations in Ronald Gray's study: e.g., about the dramatic structure of *Götz*; *Egmont* ("Goethe leaves each of the secondary figures in a box by itself"); and *Iphigenie auf Tauris* ("the ultimately egoistic basis of Iphigenia's conduct"). In the section about *Wilhelm Meister* (*Lehrjahre*) the author, who otherwise shows a keen sense and awareness of formal values in art, abruptly maintains that the sixth Book ("Confessions of a Beautiful Soul") has nothing to do with *Wilhelm Meister* at all. Surely, the whole sixth Book is organically linked up with the novel. There are obviously intended artistic parallels: cf. the religious and the "*theatralische*" *Sendung;* moreover the themes of unhappy love, eccentricity in both characters, and lack of social consciousness; and the ultimate aim: service for the good of society and mankind.

The chapter on poetry deserves special mention, and just here some comments are called for. There is for instance the question of the use of classical metres. Lack of space prevents me, unfortunately, from offering more than a few hints: there is a remarkable similarity between Greek and German accentuation. It is quite wrong to state so categorically that "there was something unnatural in the whole attempt at writing hexameters and elegiac couplets." It is indeed not unnatural to speak German in hexameters. The classical verse is dependent on quantity, but the accent is not neglected (or the classical verse would become unbearably monotonous); modern German and English verse is dictated by accent, but quantity offers variety. Goethe's epic *Hermann und Dorothea* contains, no doubt, a few artistic faults: e.g., the all-too rhetorical love-declaration, "*O, sei mir gesegnet*" (IX.221), or the leathery passage about the father's awkward love-story, "*Lieschen ... du verbrennest die Sohlen*" (II.140–1). Ronald Gray rightly calls *Hermann und Dorothea* a "serious" poem. The bad patches mentioned above are exceptions in that epic. Any ironical misinterpretation or faulty translation would grossly distort Goethe's work. Has the author misunderstood the famous passage: "*Trug mit Mannesgefühl die Heldengrösse des Weibes*"? See Ronald Gray's rendering: "Bore with manly feeling the heroic size of the woman," and the added comparison of Goethe's Dorothea with "one of those Valkyries who have absurdly come to be thought of as typical of German women." The expression "*Heldengrösse*" here does not mean physical size — it refers to quality (nobility and greatness) rather than to quantity.

In the section about *Faust* the question of inner connections and unity

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* *Goethe : A Critical Introduction.* By RONALD GRAY. (Cambridge University Press, London. 289 pp. 1967. 40s.)

offers exciting arguments. There is, of course, no unity of character, but on a higher level there is an artistic unity between the two parts of *Faust*, a unity which is usually overlooked, yet which is compelling when we interpret the whole drama in the light of the four key-words: WORT (cp. the monologues in I and II); SINN (the Gretchen tragedy and the Blocksberg episode); KRAFT (the Helena scene and the *klassische Walpurgisnacht*); TAT (Faust's ultimate endeavour to act for the benefit of mankind).

A. CLOSS

Mamallāpuram. An album prepared by ANSELM JAENICKE and HERMAN GOETZ. (Scherpe Verlag, Krefeld, W. Germany. 85 Plates+15 Vignettes. 1966. DM 68.00)

This picturesque album is a collection of photographs of the temples of South India brought back by Anselm Jaenicke, a photographer of Frankfurt, which were arranged and prepared with appropriate captions in German and English by Dr. Herman Goetz, who has spent twenty-six years in India as a research scholar and is now teaching in Heidelberg University. It transports the European scholar into the new realm of the magnanimous and magnificent art of South India, and lays open before the Indian a veritable mine of information. Though entitled *Mamallāpuram* it is not confined to Mamallāpuram but is an epitome of the rich civilization and culture of the Pallava, Chola, and Vijayanagara Kingdoms.

The album comprises eighty-five plates and fifteen vignettes of various parts of the temples of South India classified according to the periods to which they belong.

The introduction to this album, in both German and English, furnishes valuable information about the ancient civilization and culture of South India. This civilization is enveloped in a veil of obscurity, owing to the fact that Tamil, in which the entire literature is written, is unknown to the majority of scholars. Here, Dr. Herman Goetz first gives a short survey of the growth of the South Indian civilization, emphasizing mainly its relations with foreign countries. Further, the reader's interest is aroused with the detailed historical information about the Pallava and Chola kings. Finally, the *rapport* which he establishes between the religious beliefs and the divine symbolism in the art astounds the reader and leads him to a perception of the Golden Age of South India, as reflected in its monuments and works of art.

The first thirty-four illustrations deal exhaustively with the temples of Mamallāpuram and Śāluvānkūpam. Dr. Goetz explains the name Mamallāpuram: it was originally named after King Narasimhavarman I Mahāmalla (*c.* A.D. 630–68), and later on re-named Mahabalipuram after Bali. Photographs are given of the Olakanātha temple, the Talaśayāna temple, the Tiger Cave of the Śāluvānkūpa temple, which is three miles north of Mamallāpuram, and the Shore Temple of Mamallāpuram. The captions leave no mythological fact unexplained and supplement the limitations of the photographs with unparalleled skill, as in the note on the Varāha Cave Temple II (Plate 10). The author's keen interest and appreciation of art and architecture manifests itself in his remark that the structure of the Pancha Pāṇḍava Maṇḍapa is similar to Roman architecture and in his detailed description of the techniques of architecture in his caption to Bhima Ratha (Plate 19). But unfortunately his remark (Plate 27) that the Rājasiṁhapallaveśvara temple is a replica of the Kailasnātha temple at Kanchi is not very correct. The last three plates deal with the Kailasnātha Temple of Kanchi.

The Renaissance of Pallava art reached the zenith of its glory in the reign of the Chola and Vjiayanagara

kings. Plates 39–74 deal with the Bṛhadīśvara temple of Tanjore, the Naṭarāja temple at Chidambaram, and the Airāvateśvara temple at Darasuram. One is struck by Dr. Goetz's scholarly outlook and the valuable references to the dress and musical instruments of Chola times.

The last section, which deals with the art of Vijayanagara times, consists of plates of the temples at Kumbhakonam, the Jambukeśvara temple and the Ekāmbareśvara temple at Kanchi. Herein, we are furnished with valuable mythological data about the Goddess Gaṅgā, and a complete idea of the architectural style of the seventeenth century.

With an attractive and colourful get-up, this album evokes the enthusiasm of the reader, filling him with a curiosity to dive deep into its details. An effective blending of the aesthetic sense and superb skill of a photographer with the keen insight and accuracy of an experienced research scholar is reflected in this album, and renders it a valuable contribution to the traveller's and the scholar's library. We hope that it inspires more scholars to undertake works of this kind.

SHAKUNTALA N. GAYATONDE

The Doctrine of the Bhagavad-Gītā. By PANDIT BHAVANI SHANKAR. (Popular Prakashan, Bombay. 148 pp. 1966. Rs. 3.50)

Many commentaries have been written on the theme of the *Bhagavad-Gītā,* but this little book may be termed the guide book to the Great Book of Life that the *Gītā* constitutes. Written in a lucid and simple style, it takes you, step by step, verse by verse, to the uppermost rung of the Ladder of Understanding. Many an abstruse point, difficult to grasp, becomes clear through the very manner of exposition that goes straight to the core of the matter. The hidden mystery of the *Avatāras*; the meaning of the *Jīvanmukta*; and the way to reach *Mokṣa* are some of the topics explained to the reader in a patient and loving way that penetrates heart and mind and makes for understanding. The functions of the two *prakṛtis, Daivīprakṛti* and *Mūlaprakṛti,* become clear when the author states in brief terms that the former is the life-aspect and the latter the form-aspect — which helps to unravel many bewildering statements concerning them.

The four stages of initiation of the disciple, the profound teaching of Krishna underlying Chapters II to XII, given in veiled language, is brought to light by the author and explained in a way that leaves one inspired and elated.

The hidden significance of *Yajña* and renunciation, the meaning of action and inaction, and above all the mistaken ideas about *Kuṇḍalinī,* are all enumerated in a brief, relevant way that goes directly to the heart of the matter.

Altogether this little book is most inspiring and instructive, in its brevity and profundity of representation, of the most esoteric truths hidden within the contents of the *Bhagavad-Gītā.*

A. R. S.

[Please see inside the front cover for a special offer to the readers of THE ARYAN PATH as to this book.]

What the Buddha Taught. By WALPOLA SRI RAHULA. With a Foreword by PAUL DEMIEVILLE and a collection of illustrative texts translated from the original Pali. (Gordon Fraser, Bedford. 151 pp. Illustrated. Second and enlarged ed., 1967. 16*s.* 6*d.*)

The Rev. Dr. W. Rahula was trained as a Buddhist monk in Ceylon, and subsequently won academic honours at the universities of Ceylon, Calcutta, and Paris. Honoured for his work on Buddhist studies with the title of *Tripiṭakavāgīśvarācārya,* he is at present Vice-Chancellor of the Vidyodaya University, Ceylon. His compact and highly

useful work, *What the Buddha Taught*, summarizes, for the enquiring layman, the teachings of the Buddha and the main themes of Buddhist philosophy. It is surely a brilliant work of compression: all the major and essential doctrines of Buddhism are discussed — the Four Noble Truths, the Noble Eightfold Path, the Five Aggregates, Karma, Rebirth, Conditioned Genesis, the doctrine of No-Soul and the Setting-up of Mindfulness.

The author writes in such a fashion as to make the Buddhist insights as readily comprehensible as possible to those who have grown up with other religio-philosophical thought-frameworks, and the book is consequently particularly useful to readers in the Christian West. The chapter on Meditation is especially valuable to the Western reader, for it clears the air of so many misunderstandings — even dangerous malpractices — about Oriental meditation currently in vogue in some circles in the West. "What the Buddha Taught and the World Today" answers those critics who dismiss Buddhism as impractical for the modern world with all its complex problems.

Personally, I would recommend that the Western Christian reader, in search of meaningful Christian-Buddhist dialogue, should read *What the Buddha Taught* alongside pages 193–216 of Kenneth Walker's *Diagnosis of Man* (Penguin Books, 1962), which discusses the relationship of Jesus of Nazareth to Buddhist thought.

Walpola Rahula's work, first published in 1959, now appears in a revised edition, contains selected texts (pp. 91–138), and a Bibliography and a Glossary to help the English reader.

BRIAN G. COOPER

A Short Account of Greek Philosophy from Thales to Epicurus. By G. F. PARKER. (Edward Arnold, Publishers, Ltd., London. 194 pp. Map. 1967. 30*s*.)

At first I had some misgivings about this book. Its plan seemed to be to enliven a rather perfunctory handling of a veritable anthology of quotations from Blake, Hardy, Eliot, Robert Frost, and others, the relevance of which to the story of Greek philosophy was not always very great. In a steadily diminishing degree this misgiving persisted to the end of the book. The "Conclusion" (Chapter xx) bears as its sub-heading "The Dichotomies — The Convergence of the Twain." The second sub-heading is the title of Hardy's poem on the wreck of the *Titanic*, and with the quotation of this in full, all the eleven verses of it, the book ends.

Nevertheless the exposition soon began to interest me and steadily strengthened its hold on my attention. Though not always felicitous in expression the argument is serious and well-informed, often penetrating, and in general fresh and original. The analysis of the thought of Plato and Aristotle, well prepared for by what is said about the pre-Socratics, is remarkably successful for its combination of balance and brevity. The permanently valuable element in their thought is skilfully disentangled from the defects that spring from their personal limitations or the state of society. The book is specially aimed at young readers in school or university to whom the history of philosophy is presented as part of a programme of general studies; and here it may find its mark. For it is stimulating as well as informative. And it may well be that all the poetry from Chaucer to Auden will have its function in sweetening the cup. There is something infectious in Mr. Parker's enthusiasm and his readers may come to exclaim with Milton:

> How charming is divine philosophy!
> Not harsh, and crabbed as dull fools suppose,
> But musical as is Apollo's lute,
> And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets,
> Where no crude surfeit reigns.

B. FARRINGTON

In Defence of Free Will: With Other Philosophical Essays. By C. A. CAMPBELL. (Muirhead Library of Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London; Humanities Press Inc., New York. 277 pp. 1967. 45*s*.)

This book consists entirely of published papers. Part I, "Philosophy of Morals," has eight papers published between 1935 and 1951, and Part II, "Philosophy of Knowledge," has five papers published between 1945 and 1962. A penetrating, patient, and balanced thinker, Professor Campbell is never dull, and he is always lucid, although sometimes a trifle prolix. As in his final chapter, on Ryle's "The Concept of Mind," he can sustain a withering polemic against the novel and startling. As in his advocacy of libertarianism and rejection of self-determination, he can expose what is absurd in the long-established. But sometimes his progressive analysis might seem excessive, as when he takes ten pages to reach the statement, "the claim of the Self-evidentialist, as we have now come to understand it, may be positively stated in the following simple form: 'Where a proposition seems self-evident to the (pure) intellect, it is intrinsically true.'" (But the paper on self-evidence is exciting in its conclusion, when it claims for the principle of contradiction the status of a synthetic *a priori* proposition).

The book scarcely reveals the consistent wholeness of the author's thought. Compatibly with his libertarianism, he rejects post-Kantian idealist metaphysics, for all his devotion to post-Kantian idealist epistemology. Likewise he rejects original sin, while believing in the God of Theism. But, together with his libertarianism, he would revive the moral principle of self-realization. When he comes to his provocative view that moral goodness is objective whereas all other intrinsic values are subjective, he is left with no time to vindicate this. But he seems to see no need to vindicate the following statement: "If our desires conformed to duty 'of their own nature,' calling for no exercise of control, there could be no such thing as a moral life at all." A quiet optimism pervades the book, unruffled, perhaps astonishingly so, by the history of human perversity since 1935. The book should be an agreeable stimulus to sober, traditional philosophizing, immune to what is extravagant in linguistic, positivist, existentialist philosophies. As to the last, the author does not mention it. He can be a libertarian without anguish.

M. KAYE

The Literature and Thought of Modern Africa: A Survey. By CLAUDE WAUTHIER. (Pall Mall Press, London. 323 pp. 1966. 45*s*.)

As a survey of the thought of modern Africa this is a volume of great value, though its title might be slightly misleading to readers expecting close attention to specifically literary considerations. The author includes under the general heading of literature most of the significant political, sociological, anthropological, and historical contributions made by Africans, not only in English, but also in French, Spanish, and Portuguese. As a result, though he also considers works which are more strictly of literary interest, he looks at their social significance rather than their literary quality. Once this is acknowledged, however, it must be said that the range of the volume is admirable, providing the reader with perspectives into, for example, the influence of African poetry on political oratory; the Caribbean in African affairs; African historical tradition; negritude and its opponents and critics; Marxism and the role of the African proletariat; and many other fields of interest.

There are, however, a number of minor errors and omissions both in the text and in the bibliography. Claude McKay is said to be an American;

S. R. B. Attoh Ahuma appears in the bibliography as "Ahuma, Attoh," and his *Memoirs of West African Celebrities* (extensively indebted to Wilson Armistead's *Tribute for the Negro*) appears in the bibliography, but not his very much more original *The Gold Coast Nation and National Consciousness*; Ottobah Cugoano's name is spelt "Cugoana"; and while an indifferent though popular novel, Paton's *Cry the Beloved Country,* is included no mention is made of works of very much higher quality, such as the novels and short stories of William Plomer and Nadine Gordimer.

PAUL EDWARDS

A Humanist's View of Religion: The Sword of the Spirit. By SONJA BIERSTED. (Philosophical Library, New York. 151 pp. 1966. $4.50); *Religion for Mankind.* By HORACE HOLLEY. (George Ronald, London; Rupa and Co., Calcutta. 248 pp. 1967. 17*s.* 6*d.*)

The first book deals with the present-day formulations of the dogmas of Christianity, which do not please a number of people. But it is difficult to see for whom this book is intended. A catalogue of dogmatic statements collected together without theological method, repetitions of the same type without proof, but illuminated by some deep thinking — is all that there is for the seeker.

Some of the author's statements are interesting. "Mass prayers are thieveries on the Cosmic plane" (p. 40); "The idea of the historical Jesus feeds on the evil of crucifixion" (p. 42); "America openly advocates the worship of the Golden Calf" (p. 61). One wonders what L.B.J. would have to say to this. "The Western organized religious mind has been nurtured on metaphysical confusion" (p. 78). Whose, the philosophers' or the author's?

The author speaks of *Truth* (with a capital T and italics), but makes no effort to define what it is or how it works. And the reviewer is tempted to ask, Pilate-fashion—And what, Madam, is *Truth*?

Dr. Horace Holley was for more than thirty years Secretary of the Chief Administrative Institution of the Bahai Faith. The Bahai religion, growing out of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, has now assumed the dimension of a world religion.

The thirteen principles of the Faith are:

(1) The oneness of the world of Humanity. (2) The protection and guidance of the Holy Spirit. (3) The Foundation of all religion is one. (4) Religion must be the cause of unity. (5) Religion must accord with science and reason. (6) Independent investigation of truth. (7) Equality between men and women. (8) The abandonment of all prejudices among mankind. (9) Universal peace. (10) Universal education. (11) A universal auxiliary language. (12) Solution of the economic problem. (13) An international tribunal.

One may consider this Utopian; but it is a faith which attracts many adherents, particularly in the U.S.A., and this is an excellent summary of a Persian faith, having a world-wide appeal, and a magnificent temple at Wilmette, Illinois.

A. A. A. F.

Divisiveness and Social Conflict: An Anthropological Approach. By ALLAN R. BEALS and BERNARD J. SIEGEL. (Stanford University Press, Calif., U.S.A.; Oxford University Press, Bombay. 185 pp. 1967. Rs. 37.50)

The authors have made an important contribution to the problem of social conflict. The intra-group conflict can be studied from more than one angle and the authors have taken into account anthropological, sociologi-

cal, and psychological considerations and have tried to evaluate the work done in these different areas of inquiry. They have mainly concentrated on "divisiveness" as the basis and substratum of every conflict and have tried to assess the significance of what they call environmental stress and social strain in the development of conflict. The emergence of conflict in a social organization has a self-destructive tendency and if the society is to survive immediate action is called for to combat it.

The authors have based their conclusion on a field research of communities as diversely located as the South Indian Community of "Namhalli" and the Pueblo American Community of Taos. The authors are concerned with the internal conflicts, with conflicts occurring within organizations, and it is but natural to think that our understanding of internal conflicts might lead us to a better awareness of the factors which lead to global conflicts, however different in nature these conflicts might be. Anyhow, we have to accept "divisiveness" as a pervasive factor of human life which we cannot afford to ignore. We may even wonder whether it has only a negative character and does not serve some positive purpose in the life of the group.

The writers have collected very valuable material and have ably utilized it for the development of their theory of conflict. The presentation is well informed and refreshing. The Bibliography is very helpful.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

Her-Bak: Egyptian Initiate. By ISHA SCHWALLER DE LUBICZ. Translated by RONALD FRASER. (Hodder and Stoughton, London. 220 pp. 1967. 35*s*.)

This book, the successor to *Her-Bak, Chick-Pea* by the same authoress, would seem unclassifiable. In form it is a novel, though its novelistic qualities are slight indeed. In essence it portrays "in one individual's life a path of progress through temple training" at Karnak between the twentieth and twenty-first dynasties of Ancient Egypt, and is the fruit of Mme de Lubicz's fifteen years in that land, among tombs and temples, "probing the symbolism of the hieroglyphs."

The system expounded is consistent, impressive, and wide-embracing; the reader is well advised to read the translator's informative Introduction with its descriptions ("definitions" would lend a false precision) of key-terms like *akh, ba, ka,* or the *Neters* ("causal Ideas immanent or virtually contained in nature, themselves the principles and agents of manifestation ... ," p. 13). Remarkable changes are rung on these and similar concepts: e.g., the "Seven Days" (chapters) of Part II elucidate the relations between *ba* and *ka*. Exact attention is needed, e.g. (p. 78): "I am looking for the relation between *za,* magic power, *sa,* back, and *saa,* sage," or (p. 56) the distinction between *neter* and *nefer*. Pervasive is the cult of Number, and still more that of the quasi-Kabbalic symbolism of letters. A few instances will give the atmosphere:

> [In *nefer*] between *n* and *r* the letter *f* is inserted, the letter for breath and for the air that quickens primitive life." (p. 55)
>
> ... the word for brain, *ais,* is an inversion of *sia,* the consciousness of the heart. ... *Âmm,* by the double *m,* gives the idea of reabsorption into oneself, monopolization. *Â* suggests individual limitation." (p. 90)

— or the dissections of *iaaw* and *inek* (p. 157) and of *neserser* (pp. 189 and 192).

Important is Chapter X, "Hierarchy of the Neters," with a good explanation of animal symbolism. Animal sacrifice, too, is equivocally "justified" on p. 32. In such passages, as with the stress on Pharaoh and royalty (e.g., p. 79, also the final chapter), the authoress stays entombed in Egyptian concepts, giving the book its curious blend of universality and archaeological limitation. None the less it is fascinating and quite

original. The last words are: "you are the temple which the Neter of Neters inhabits. Awaken Him ... then let the temple fall crashing."

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS

Stotrārṇavaḥ. Edited by T. CHANDRASEKHARAN. (Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. 736 pp. 1961. Rs. 20.30)

Under the covers of this massive volume we have a large collection of as many as 200 *stotras* or devotional hymns in Sanskrit, addressed to the deities Gaṇeśa, Śiva Viṣṇu, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Subrahmaṇya and Devī, most of them printed here for the first time on the basis of MSS. preserved in the Madras Government Manuscripts Library.

Almost all these are anonymous compositions written in the decadent period of Sanskrit poetry (*c.* fourteenth to nineteenth centuries), when original creation had become rare and the flair for imitation of older models held sway over the minds of poets. Religious poetry has always been very popular in India, gaining in width as well as depth in the course of centuries, and claiming among its votaries philosophers like Śaṅkara, master-poets like Bāṇa and mystic saints like Līlāśuka. At a time when court poetry threatened to lose touch with the life of the people, the credit of having rejuvenated it with new life goes surely to the religious poets; and up to the present day *stotras* continue to have a permanent place in the hearts of Indians. But the present collection does not represent that rich creative phase; it mirrors only a later phase when inspiration had almost run dry and made room for intellectual exercises.

No wonder, then, that this veritable "ocean" of hymns has a place for writings of varying length and merit. Poems full of lyric fervour and deep mysticism jostle with dry catalogues of the deity's names (p. 201, etc.); the compelling quality of the few poems with a fine literary finish and a meditative or devotional trend (p. 141, p. 541, etc.) is annulled by the cheap alliterative tricks and worldly prayers which are the concern of many. In literary worth, philosophical content and religious devotion, there is much unevenness from poem to poem, and solid gold is rare. Yet the MSS. Library deserves our thanks for having rescued from oblivion a large number of works, some of which might prove rewarding not only to the student of Indian religion but also to the religious-minded public.

The work seems to have been rushed through the press in indecent haste. The Errata run to full thirteen pages.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

Śrī-Lalitā-Triśatī-Bhāṣya of SRI-SHANKARA-BHAGAVATPADA. With an English Translation by CHAGANTI SURYANARAYANA MURTHY. (Ganesh and Co., Madras. 139 pp. 1967. Rs. 5.00)

Śrī-Lalitā-Triśatī-Stotra, sung in praise of the goddess Lalita or Tripura Sundari, occurs in *Brahmāṇda Purāṇa,* whose author was Veda Vyasa. One of the recognized forms of worship is *Śrī-vidyā,* the worship of the Supreme in its feminine aspect. The three hundred names of the Goddess contained in the Stotra not only deal with Śiva and Śakti but also with the *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* aspects of *Brahman.*

The most celebrated *mantra* connected with the worship of the goddess is the *Pañcadaśākṣarī Mantra.* As its name indicates, it consists of fifteen syllables; it is divided into three *kūṭas* or sections. The *Mantra* is identified with the Goddess herself in subtle form. The *Stotra* has twenty names beginning with each of the syllables and gives the *Mantra* indirectly.

The *Stotra* was delivered by Hayagrīva, and *avatār* of Viṣṇu, to his dis-

ciple, Agastya. It is considered that Lord Śiva and His Consort were themselves the authors of this *Stotra*. It is called "*sarva-pūrtikārī*," as it is believed to fulfil all the wishes of the reciter devotees.

This is the author's second publication on Lalitā. It appears that he has made a special study of the literature on Lalitā. This book is based on the Sanskrit Commentary of Ācārya Śaṅkara. In his illuminating introduction, the author has dealt with the *Jñāna* and *Bhakti* aspects of the search for *Brahman* in Advaita Vedanta.

K. E. PARTHASARATHY

Musiqi ki Shar'i Haithiat (Music in the Light of Muslim Law). By IMAM GHAZALI. Translated and arranged in Urdu by SAYYED NASIR SHAH and RAFIULLAH. (Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, Pakistan. 192 pp. 1964. Rs. 2.00)

This is the translation of the chapter on "Absorption and Music" (*wajd-o-sama*) from Imam Ghazali's famous book *Ihyā-i-'Uloomuddin*. He gives arguments both in favour of music and against it from the *Koran* and the practice of the Prophet and his companions.

He says that music which excites the baser sentiments of the hearers should be avoided. Moreover, the music which keeps one away from his duties to God and man is not permissible by Muslim law. All music which leads towards God and goodness is permissible.

The book is worth reading.

M. AJMAL KHAN

A. R. WADIA

Sir Rustom P. Masani: In Memoriam

[In November this year falls the first anniversary of the passing of Sir Rustom Masani, distinguished in both civic and intellectual life. We print this brief memoir by our old and esteemed friend, Professor A. R. Wadia, in tribute to Sir Rustom's memory. We are glad to learn that this tribute is to be translated into Gujarati for publication in a special issue of *Gyan Prakash* in memory of Sir Rustom.—ED.]

FROM 1876 to 1966 constitutes a long span of ninety years and it synchronized with the life of Sir Rustom Masani, one of the foremost citizens of Bombay. Age sat lightly on him. His abstemious and regulated life left him young with but a sprinkling of grey hairs, a slim figure, and a mind as agile at ninety as at any time before. His long life was a record of long service in varied fields: administration, banking, industry, education, religion, history and literature. Many have varied interests, but it is given to very few to shine in all of them. Sir Rustom was one of these few.

He started life in the service of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, and served for years as its Secretary. He had the chance of acting as Municipal Commissioner. Because the Commissionership used to be the closed preserve of European I.C.S. officers, Sir Rustom could not continue in this high office and he thought it better to resign. He was asked by the Central Bank of India to take up its managership. Though for varied reasons he did not continue long in this post, his eminence in the banking world was accepted when he was asked to serve as a member of a banking inquiring committee. When Sir Vithal Chandavarkar retired as Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University he was anxious to be succeeded by Sir Rustom Masani and the Government was pleased to agree with him. Though he continued to be the Vice-Chancellor only for a short term of three years, he

made his mark. I do not remember that he struck headlines in the papers, but I was very happy to be told by a retired Director of Public Instruction in Bombay that in his opinion Sir Rustom had proved to be the best Vice-Chancellor Bombay University had had. Opinions are bound to vary but there can be no doubt that he was one of the most successful and widely respected Vice-Chancellors. This is a significant tribute, as he was not an educationist as ordinarily understood, but his scholarly interests and strong common sense and administrative experience enabled him to have a firm grasp of educational problems. One of the secrets of his success was that he never hesitated to learn from others and was not slow in pushing up ideas that caught his imagination.

Great as his achievements were in the field of administration, at heart he was a scholar and his best work was in the field of literature. In his earlier years he must have been a voracious reader of English novels and had sufficient command over both Gujarati and English to make him take up the role of a translator. I remember reading in my school days his *Chandra-Chal,* a translation of Wilkie Collins's famous novel *The Moonstone.* In later years, as the sphere of his activities widened, I wonder if he could have found time to read novels except perhaps as a relaxation after a hard day's work.

I have already referred to his will to learn from others. One recalls with admiration, not unmixed with amusement, that even at the age of fifty he did not disdain the pupil state and obtained London University's Certificate of Merit with distinction in Economics.

It is a regular conundrum how he ever got into administrative employment when he had an insatiable itch for writing. Even as a first-year student at Elphinstone College he used to contribute to the columns of *Jam-e-Jamshed* — and even of *Gup-Sup,* which bears witness to the sense of humour that must have gone far to keep him young even in his old age. When he was only twenty-three he was editing the English columns of *Kaiser-i-Hind.* He even had the distinction of editing *Indian Spectator,* which had been founded and edited for years by that great social reformer, Behramji Malabari.

Apart from *Chandra-Chal,* he had to his credit other Gujarati novels: *Bodhlun, Abyssinian Habsi, Rezia Begum* and *Bhai ke Bharthar.*

As an anthropologist he wrote *Folklore of Wells: A Study of Water Worship in East and West.* It was of such sound scholarship that some chapters were translated into French. His interest in anthropology was lifelong. For years he continued to be the President of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.

Though Sir Rustom was born in the priestly caste he was never orthodox, for he was too much of a reformer to believe in blind orthodoxy. He was proud to be a Zoroastrian, as his work on *Zoroastrianism: The Religion of Good Life* goes to show abundantly. When Dadabhai Naoroji died, the late Sir Narayan Chandavarkar in his funeral oration described Dadabhai as "The Prophet Zoroaster's religion personified." The same tribute could be deservedly repeated in the case of Sir Rustom Masani. Like a true Zoroastrian he was a *karma-yogin.* His Foreword to Dastur Daboo's *Message of Zarathustra* bears witness to his addiction to truth even while prepared to admire Dasturji's learning. Dastur Daboo is a man of convictions, a theosophist. He believes in the transmigration of the soul and rebirth. I too believe in rebirth, though I am not prepared to believe that it forms a part of Zoroastrian teachings. Sir Rustom too was of this opinion and so did not agree with Dastur Daboo, and modestly speaks of himself in the Foreword as "one of the unfortunates who remain unconvinced."

Sir Rustom was a sound scholar of Persian and became a lover of Sufi poetry. One offshoot of this love was his *Conference of Birds,* a free and abridged translation of Farid-ud-din Attar's *Mantiq-ut-Tayr.* It is a fascinat-

ing allegory depicting the mystics' hunt for God. The allegory depicts birds as searching for a leader and ultimately fixing their choice on the simurg. The problem was to find him, and they set out on a search for him. It proved a long and weary search. Many died on the way of hunger and cold and suffering. Only thirty succeeded in their quest. They found him but saw in him only a mirror reflecting each of their number. This is how the riddle of I and Thou which has been the tormenting problem of the Sufi search for God has been solved.

As far back as 1939 Messrs. Allen and Unwin of London published *Life of Dadabhai Naoroji* from the pen of Sir Rustom Masani. It is now out of print, but the Government of India has published an abridged version, which can serve as a reminder to the younger generation of Indians who, in the blaze of Gandhiji's work, are apt to ignore the great work of earlier men like Dadabhai. He was the first Indian member of the House of Commons and the first to raise the slogan of *Swaraj* for Indians. That a majority of English voters in Finsbury voted him to Parliament by itself speaks volumes for the catholicity of the British character. In 1866 was formed the East India Association in London through the efforts of Dadabhai and some English friends of India. In 1869 during his visit to Bombay he gave an address in which he expounded the work of the Association in England and gave fearless expression to his faith in the British character:

> The Englishman is incapable of despotism. He might, and often did, carry things with a high hand, but the instinct and love of liberty, the constitutionalism which is born with and ingrained in him made him at the time of trial recoil from being stigmatized a despot.

The faith was fully shared by the founders of the Indian National Congress. It was a faith which Gandhiji continued to have in spite of all his sufferings in South Africa. It was a faith which Sir Rustom fully shared and which, though he was never in the front rank of Indian politicians, made him a friend of British viceroys and governors and gave him opportunities to be a liaison officer, though unofficially, between Indian politicians and the British powers that were. The closing words in Sir Rustom's *Life of Dadabhai Naoroji* speak for themselves:

> India and Britain, wherever the highest level is reached on either side, are singularly akin. They have learnt during the past century of close contact to understand each other. Their mutual understanding grew stronger during some years before the withdrawal of British power from India and their mutual respect has since grown stronger in recent years. The struggle to attain self-rule carried with it a nobility on both sides. No doubt much of the opposite character was also witnessed during the hours of strife. But again and again the higher note had risen above the struggle and in the end prevailed.

The influence of Dadabhai on all Indians who came into contact with him was very marked, particularly on the young students who found in him a friend, nay, a father. One of them was no less a person than Gandhiji himself, who in his Foreword to Masani's book wrote:

> Indeed, he was in the place of father to every one of the Indian students, no matter to which province or religion they belonged. He was there to advise and guide them in their difficulties. I have always been a hero-worshipper. And so Dadabhai became a real *Dada*. The relationship took the deepest root in South Africa, for he was my constant adviser and inspiration. Hardly a week passed without a letter from me to him describing the conditions of Indians in South Africa.

As Sir Rustom was a friend and admirer of Gandhiji it is intelligible that he should have become an admirer of Shri Vinoba Bhave. Vinobaji as a devout and sincere follower of Gandhiji stands out in marked contrast to his countless political followers, big and small. Sir Rustom has written a life of Vinobaji too. It may be questioned whether he whole-heartedly accepted the

economic ideas of Vinobaji and his work for *grāmdān* as a solution of India's economic ills.

Another of his biographical ventures, *N. M. Wadia and His Foundation,* illustrates specially his suave integrity. During his life N. M. Wadia was reputed the greatest miser among the multi-millionaires of Bombay. When he died in 1908, it came as a surprise that he had left a will creating a vast fund to be used for charitable purposes on a cosmopolitan basis. His properties were estimated at a crore and a half in those days. Today the value has gone up perhaps tenfold. Five trustees were named in the will. Later as vacancies arose they were filled up by the surviving trustees. One of the vacancies came to be filled up by Sir Rustom, who thus came into the field of philanthropy and by virtue of his abilities came to have a commanding position among the Trustees. To celebrate the Golden Jubilee of the Foundation the Trustees resolved to bring out a biography of the Founder and the task was inevitably and wisely entrusted to Sir Rustom. It was not an easy task. In other hands it could have easily emerged as just fulsome flattery. But Sir Rustom steered his course skilfully between Scylla and Charybdis. He could not suppress the miserliness of his hero — he euphemistically calls it love of hoarding — but he does not fail to make much of the few crumbs of generosity which the multi-millionaire permitted himself in some rare moments.

But Sir Rustom's moral stature asserted itself when he came to deal with the Founder's treatment of his wife Hirabai. The relations between the husband and wife were rather strained, but even so in the first draft of his will Shri Wadia had made generous provision for his wife. Unfortunately one of her nephews got into financial difficulties and persuaded his aunt to mortgage a costly diamond necklace. As might have been expected, it was not redeemed, and when the husband came to know of it, he grew furious and changed his will, leaving Hirabai a mere pittance. She had a good case and many lawyers advised her to challenge the will. If she had, the munificent Foundation might have come to naught. But she was a typical Parsi wife of the old generation and she refused to go against her husband's will and was content with the soft words of the then Trustees and some concessions they made in her favour. An ordinary biographer could have easily passed over the whole episode, which was known only to a few members of the Wadia family. But Sir Rustom was a real Zoroastrian, wedded to truth. He felt a great injustice had been done to an innocent wife, and he devoted a full chapter to the whole episode to do justice to a noble woman who had been treated with gross injustice. I cannot but repeat that Sir Rustom's moral stature has risen to great heights in my estimation.

Last but not least is his work as a historian. One of his very last books was *Britain in India,* published by the Oxford University Press. It was sent to me by the author "with warmest regards" and I look upon it as one of my most valued possessions. It is written by a great friend and admirer of England who is also at the same time a loving son of India. He has brought to bear on his work a remarkable sense of objectivity: criticizing when he must and admiring when he cannot but. It is refreshing for the younger generation of Indians, brought up in the poisoned atmosphere of mere politics, to learn that long before the withdrawal of the British from India in 1947, for over a century, great Englishmen had foreseen it and worked hard for it. As far back as 1813 no less a person than the then Governor-General, the Marquis of Hastings, had suggested voluntary withdrawal of power. His lieutenant Sir Thomas Munro dreamed of the independence of India in Madras. And in Bombay, too, Mountstuart Elphinstone had no illusions on the subject. If the Englishman stood for liberty, as all Indians of the nineteenth and early twentieth century right up to the time of, and including, Gandhiji had stead-

fastly believed, it was inevitable that when the time came the Indians would be masters in their own country. It came to be so in 1947. It might have happened earlier but for the tangle of Hindu-Muslim relations.

Sir Rustom's *Britain in India* deserves to be much better known than it seems to be. It is a piece of sound scholarship and bears the true hallmark of historical objectivity.

Vast though the range of his scholarship was, he was by no means a bookworm. He had deep human interests. His abiding interest in children was shown in his lifelong devotion to the Byramji Jeejeebhai Home for Destitute Children. In this he was whole-heartedly assisted by his wife, Lady Masani. It was an exhilarating experience to notice that both of them knew the inmates individually by name and took a paternal interest in each. The Home particularly looks after the children under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, which was passed when Shri Kanyalal Munshi was the Home Minister. Sir Rustom had given a helping hand in this legislation as well as in that connected with beggars. Nor did the plight of destitute women escape his attention. Society tends to be more puritanical than really moral in its attitude to unmarried mothers, deserting or deserted wives, and destitute widows, with all the risks to which they are exposed. Sir Rustom was a genuine humanist and he was more interested in rehabilitating them than in sitting in judgement on them and condemning them as human pariahs. He adorned the ranks of social workers by working in the true Zoroastrian and Biblical spirit of helping the poor and the destitute and the suffering.

We have noted so far only the activities of Sir Rustom. This sketch, however brief, would be incomplete without drawing a picture of Sir Rustom as a man. I remember meeting him for the first time over half a century ago. I vividly remember his smiling face, his courteous manners even to a youngster like me. Since then I met him an umpteen number of times at much closer quarters and my first impression was more and more confirmed. In view of the high positions he came to occupy I was always struck by his modesty and humility. He was always willing to learn, seldom making his listener realize how much he had to give. Unlike so many others who live in and for publicity he believed in doing his work. While he was careful to avoid hurting anyone's feelings he kept to his convictions. This has been noted above particularly in the matter of Smt. N. M. Wadia. His suavity of temperament and cool way of reasoning brought him friends of all types, whether they were British governors and I.C.S. officials or politicians of all shades of party affiliations. He was a useful connecting link between the rulers and the ruled at critical times in the course of the Indian struggle for freedom.

His long and happy married life extending over sixty years has been an inspiration to others. If the success of a marriage is to be gauged by the quality of children produced, the Masani family can well stand the test.

I shall never forget a touching scene at Sir Rustom's funeral at the Towers of Silence. I saw an old Parsee gentleman weeping profusely. I do not know whether he was a relation or a friend or one of the many he had helped in life. I was reminded of the lines of Sadi:

> When you were born, you cried and others laughed;
> When you die, see that you laugh and others cry.

How true this was of Sir Rustom!

A. R. WADIA

BALDOON DHINGRA

Leaves from a Paris Diary

WE were sitting in the Café du Rond-Point des Champs-Elysées when I remarked:

"It's Baudelaire's death centenary today."

"So it is," said Christian Belle.

"Do you know what he said speaking of France? — 'I'm bored in France because everyone is like Voltaire!' "

"The kind of remark I would have made myself," Christian Belle told me. "Indeed I feel that all the time. France is so "*anti-poète*."

We went on to discuss some of Baudelaire's poems — the *Correspondances, Le Chat, La Vie Antérieure* — and how he claimed that it was the function of the artist to decipher the hidden writing of nature and to interpret the mysteries of the universe. We agreed that Baudelaire was not interested in material beauty alone; beauty was to him a spiritual reality and art the best means of effecting beauty in this world. He wanted to create, and did create, a spiritual shock from aspects people thought ugly.

"*Tu m'as donné ta boue et j'en ai fait de l'or.*" Yes, indeed: from mud and filth he could distil beauty. It is this aspect which people did not see; for if you do Baudelaire becomes a spiritual poet. That is what Saint-Exupéry said when he spoke of the cedar-tree which lives on mud, but transforms it into a crown of leafage, fed by sunlight. Thus mud is transmuted into virtue.

"But you see," said my good friend Christian, interrupting my fancies, "the French are not poets. They have never produced one of the world's great poets, and when they do produce poets they do so by forcing them to become outcasts."

"Like Villon and Voltaire?"

"Exactly. The two were probably our only true poets."

We recalled what André Gide said when he was asked who was the greatest poet of France: "Victor Hugo, *hélas*!" You cannot help that when French is a language admirably fit for prose.

"It is more than that; we French people want everything so cut and mostly dried that poetry which has a sense of mystery about it is never taken seriously except by a very, very few. You know one wants to feel, to be a poet. So many people are poets even if they never write poetry."

"Like you, my dear Christian. You are a true poet at heart; for you can give of yourself and can truly let yourself go in the right surroundings. Here you are held in a grip. You are a mystic; you mistrust the intellect: the Frenchman thrives on it.

I think here is a touch of the 'barbarian' in your blood; you enjoy the warm humanity of people and things. The French are much too civilized. Their historical career has ended. They can sit back and recapitulate. You know I am reminded of what Sterne once said: that there was a tendency in France to deal playfully with grave things and gravely with playful things — an intellectual distinction."

But even that distinction, Christian pointed out, is diminishing or even dying out, though I agree that, for us to believe in an idea, it must first pass through the filter of the intellect.

As we talked on a little longer I thought of the new art exhibitions that were on, of El Greco specially, of the humanism of the great masters, and of a dozen other things including what would happen in a few years to the city of Paris, where the noise drowns conversation and annihilates sleep. I thought of the work of modern artists, of Bernard Buffet and his school, and of the spirit of adventure, great in itself, which characterizes European culture but which could eventually defeat its own purpose (for, if history has a beginning, it must inevitably have an end). Thank Heavens, Christian seemed

to say, there are still people who do not have to carry the heavy burden of history on their shoulders.

What a dismal prophet was Oswald Spengler! To him culture had two phases: the springtime of culture when art blooms and men's thoughts ripen, and next the dry, shrivelled, empty period of art when the cold hand of custom withers everything it touches. This presages suicide and Caesarism, so well described by my friend Amaurey de Reincourt in *The Coming Caesars*.

What happens, then, to the artists like Grétou Marbat, who paints as though inspired? She keeps on producing painting after painting, rich, full of vitality, yet simple, fantastic, at times almost naïve. Grétou believes she captures the spirit of Japanese painting; for here is a Samurai and there a something which, according to her, is inspired by Zen. At times Grétou has intimations of the very dim past. She is convinced she belongs to the East, and yet her painting has a faery quality; it captures odd creatures — bluebirds, prehistoric animals — and then she is transported into prehistory. The other day Grétou gave me a painting which she says is a Biblical scene. In a way — and this is very much in Grétou's favour — she does not let her inspiration confine her to a particular geographical area or time. If anything, there is a timeless quality about the children, which are never arranged or planned; they come as the painting shapes itself. Grétou mixes the colours but the ideas shape themselves. They are not afterwards worked upon. The paintings have all the strength and the weaknesses of spontaneous effort. They are quite enchanting.

It all began four years ago. Grétou had someone bring her canvas and paint. He was himself an artist. And he commanded: Go ahead, paint! Just like that. And ever since then, Grétou has gone on painting. It was once a pastime; it has now become a necessity, almost a religion. But Grétou belongs to no school and is self-taught; her inspiration has not quailed, and she paints, almost without knowing it, in forms which could please publishers seeking to illustrate children's stories. But what Grétou would dearly like to bring about is a spiritual equilibrium of Europe and Asia. As I see it, however, Grétou's art is a search for the lost paradise. She does not stick to any fixed rules, though the rules are there; her work is not impersonal like much of modern painting.

Art, especially Greek and Gothic, succeeded in reconciling the discordant forces within the human spirit, reason and feeling, the self and the Universe. Many artists have been homesick for the lost paradise, but one cannot really recapture the past. All such attempts are only partly successful.

Intellect has, for centuries, been developing at the expense of emotion; only a new turn of the wheel which will raise emotion to the level of the intellect can bring a new harmony. That is why art is no longer symbolic. As long as man felt the mystery of the universe he tried to get nearer to it through symbols; but, once he has understood the universe of the natural sciences, goodbye to symbolism. The moment art ceases to be symbolic there is only one thing to do — imitate nature, or, as now, paint the tangles and tentacles within.

A work of art is a means whereby we come to an understanding with the external world or with the world within; realms which inspire fear or love. The work of art is the visible result, the materialization of this understanding; it is emancipation from fear, the fulfilment of love.

I think Christian Belle would agree there, but an incredible passivity is overpowering people; this passivity or sedentariness of the spirit, indifference, is taking possession of people. Is it a phase? I do not know, but thank Heavens for certain oases in the desert! There will always be oases no matter what happens.

BALDOON DHINGRA

Ends and Sayings

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

The theme of a most intuitive article by the Marquis of St. Innocence (*British Vegetarian,* September-October 1967), "The Root of Survival," is "the great dire heresy of separateness" that makes man sin against his vital relationship to the One Life. Living in a wasteland of the spirit, he creates similar deserts in his material environment. Forgetting that his bodily life is rooted in the earth's thin layer of topsoil, he depletes and destroys it, and brings on starvation and drought. He attempts to conquer Nature, sacrificing the other kingdoms for his own ends, and is himself more and more obsessed by the material forces of violence, so that war and destruction become the mainspring of his existence. "More concerned with economic power than with people," with "material goods rather than ... moral values," with "government-sponsored programmes profitable to pressure groups," rather than with "individual choice and achievement," man has become the great Destroyer. Symbolic of this is the vast Sahara, itself larger than Australia, U.S.A., or India, made arid wasteland by short-sighted exploitation, past and present. Yet man, the Marquis laments, instead of exploring the higher spaces of inner consciousness where the recognition of life as a unity brings strength and fulfilment, instead of reclaiming the wastelands here, is reaching out greedy hands to the vaster wasteland of the moon. Yet — and he cites Richard St. Barbe Baker — if the defence forces of the world were to unite to reclaim the Sahara, "millions and millions of starving people could be fed and rehabilitated *without additional cost to any government.*"

Yet the physical desert, the Marquis writes, is little compared with the "limitless desert of the unenlightened mind that thinks it can deter the enemy by returning evil for evil." Only Love can make *this* desert fertile. We cannot control the outer environment with its deserts until we have learned self-control:

> To the spiritually inexperienced ... self-control may sound like giving up most of the pleasures of life. In reality, however, there are no delights on earth equal to those that can be discovered along the path which leads out of the Spiritual Sahara of the twentieth century towards higher levels of understanding.

For the Marquis, Karma is very real — we do indeed reap what we sow. As we destroy, so, in accord with the Oneness of life, we ourselves suffer destruction. We are not victims of circumstance, since we have the power to change the causes, and the inner growth of Spirit will, in time, be reflected in a fruitful and peaceful Nature.

Lord Ritchie Calder, reporting the annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science at Leeds (*New Statesman,* 8 September 1967), used the title "The Scientific Third Dimension" to indicate that science should be concerned not only with "how" but also with "why." The meeting now provides less of a platform for announcing discoveries than a forum for the discussion of controversial issues (there were six such symposia). The Presidential address by Lord Jackson of Burnley, "Science, Technology and Society," showed how, because of the complex reactions between science and the now-dominating technology, the original purpose of fostering "scientific awareness" was being increasingly replaced by the need for "awareness of the impact on society of proposed technological decisions" (Anthony Tucker, *The Guardian,* 30 August 1967).

Research and development have now become "High Policy and Big Business" (Calder), affecting developed and developing countries alike. The demand for scientists and technologists is increasing, yet school children and students have reacted strongly in favour of the arts and social sciences. The universities and colleges had 1,600 empty science places last year. In schools only 35.6 per cent of pupils chose science. What charm science may have had has been destroyed by bad teaching or by the feeling of revulsion expressed by one speaker: "Physics and chemistry are about bombs and insecticides and therefore bad." Lord Calder wrote: "We have oversold science as vocational training for a sure-fire pay packet to a generation which is not without ideals."

In his address to the Engineering Section Professor M. W. Thring foretold that, within about thirty years, the merely affluent society would become a creative one which would judge engineering projects morally:

> In the moral spectrum of machines, education, communication, medical, and other social aids take pride of place: public services, agriculture and antidrudgery devices come second, cosmetic machines for human vanity lie well down the scale, and machines for killing or destruction or which deface or pollute are clearly at the lowest and most undesirable end. (*The Guardian,* 1 September 1967)

At present the whole scale is upside down, but, since "technology will not automatically reorientate itself," the understanding of social responsibility must be cultivated in university and college engineering departments. Professor Thring suggested a Hippocratic Oath for engineers, that they would work for the highest moral and social good.

In one of the most controversial debates, "Escape Into Space," the supporters of space flight, as the most important research project of any century, were confronted by those who felt strongly that it deflected money and attention away from vital, urgent human needs. Dr. J. W. Findlay, Chairman of the Lunar and Planetary Board of the U.S. NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) — which budgets nearly $5,000,000,000, 1 per cent of U.S. Gross National Product — compared the programme of Manned Space Flight to the "adventure" of climbing Everest, but admitted it had little connection with real science. NASA is a vast employer of direct and indirect labour: 5 per cent of all American scientists and engineers are employed by it, and sooner or later involved in defence or space programmes. The whole national educational curriculum is consequently distorted, with repercussions on the rest of the world. Lord Bowden attacked their space programme as "the most extravagant, most sophisticated and most dangerous system of outdoor relief ever devised by a great nation in peacetime."

Professor Dennis Gabor asked whether, even if the programme of this "archetypal dream" of space flight were cancelled, the funds would go to famine relief, education projects, etc., or to the antimissile-missile programme. Compared with that danger, space research was trivial.

It is certain that, whatever funds and skills are available, they will only feed vested interests, national jealousies, individual selfishnesses, till mankind makes a change of mind and heart. But it is good that men are prepared to question in Lord Calder's "Third Dimension."

A moving plea for religious education in State schools is made by Professor W. E. Niblett of the Institute of Education, University of London (*The Guardian,* 14 September 1967). But this, he makes haste to say, is neither indoctrination, nor memorizing of creeds and scriptures, nor an automatic acceptance of inherited superstitions and "reverential" attitudes. All such could be harmful. Religious education should present a way of understanding and evaluating life and death, since without its experience men and women remain incomplete as human beings. It should

not attempt to convert the pupil to any particular religious dogma, but it should be "concerned with the perception of meaning in things, as distinct from learning how to use them." The teacher's integrity is the chief factor, since he will thus be able to convey something from the depths of his own belief, while leaving the child's interior life free to grow.

Without religion, Professor Niblett affirms, we have no purpose in understanding the world. Our only aim would be the acquisition of knowledge by which we could manipulate it to suit our own ends. But would happiness come from the unending technological conquests? Or is the actual struggle and search more satisfying than the achievement? The recognition of the greater significance of the less concrete and self-interested experiences is, he claims, "the raw material for religious education." Though religious appreciation could be communicated in the teaching of almost any subject, yet there might well be the tendency, in a society geared to "virtuous materialism" and "success," for it to be ignored, unless special periods are devoted to opening up

> a quite different concept of man's scope and nature — exemplified in the imaginative view of man's real interest depicted in the Old Testament, the Koran or the Bhagavad-Gita. It has a proper and necessary place in the school programme, and without it even moral education and ethics may be less humane.

By a reaction against false religious dogmas and escapisms, the idea of soul existence has been derided, yet we ignore it at our peril. In pointing the way to true soul education Professor Niblett puts us in his debt.

Hopeful is the small beginning made in what the U.K. Defence White Paper of February 1967 calls "the peaceful uses of military forces," about which Hugh Hanning writes ("Civil Army," *The Guardian*, 29 August 1967). OPMAC (Operations for Military Assistance to the Community) has started one scheme in Scotland, with plans for constructing a rural water supply; for reconstructing a road to the Lifeboat Station; for bridge-building to facilitate mountain rescue work; for helping the preservation projects of the National Trust; demolishing derelict buildings; and so on. To critics claiming that all this is simply to keep the troops occupied, the answer is that it is valuable training. Soldiering is different today from its previous image. It demands training in many "para-military" skills — police action, U.N. operations, fire-fighting, "village development work ... medical, engineering and even educational guidance."

How this development of military aid to the community will work out will inevitably depend on the way it is operated and the motive behind it, but the idea has great potential value.